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INTRODUCTION 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 
obby Lobby and its quest for religious freedom captured the 
attention of a nation for a few moments in late June 2014. The 
country honed in on the Supreme Court as the Justices weighed the 
rights of an incorporated, profit-making entity run by devout 
individuals that objected to particular entitlements granted to women 
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Hobby Lobby case raised 
important legal issues such as whether the law allows for-profit 
corporations to exercise religion (yes!) and whether protection for 
religious freedom trumps the rights of third parties to cost-free 
preventive health care (sort of!). The Court’s decision also brought to 
light some major ethical dilemmas such as: (1) whether the 
government has the right to second-guess a person’s religious beliefs, 
(2) when do religious beliefs become too attenuated from the actions 
they oppose to truly pose a burden on religion, and (3) whether only 
human beings can experience religion. Though the lawyers will move 
on to the next legal challenge, Americans in general must continue to 
grapple with these ethical dilemmas as citizens of a society that needs 
to find the appropriate balance between religious freedom and 
improving public heath. 
This Article attempts to answer some of these questions by 
evaluating the Hobby Lobby case from many different angles. Part I 
recounts the stories underlying the legal challenge. When told in 
depth, these stories, often neglected in law review articles and judicial 
opinions, add context and nuance to the case and help bring topics to 
H
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life that seem boring if analyzed purely in legalese. For example, the 
Greens tell a story of a family that considers its work at Hobby Lobby 
a fulfillment of its calling from God. The Greens sincerely believe 
they are expected to practice their religion at work even if it costs the 
corporation, and themselves, a great deal of money. The federal 
government tells the story of a nation in desperate need of better and 
less expensive health care options, particularly for women. The 
government claims that women need cost-free preventive health care 
(and particularly cost-free contraceptives) in order to improve their 
health and reduce unwanted pregnancies. Better access to 
contraceptives will also give women more power to control their 
reproductive lives and compete more effectively in the workplace. 
Part I brings these litigants to life and sets the stage for a discussion of 
the law in Part II. 
More specifically, Part II synthesizes the state of the law 
surrounding religious freedom and preventive health care at the time 
the Hobby Lobby case hit the Supreme Court. This Part recounts the 
history of religious freedom in America and how this concept worked 
its way into the first words of the First Amendment and eventually 
into the broadly protective Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA). Part II ends with an evaluation of the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate and its requirements regarding access to cost-free preventive 
health care for women. 
Part III evaluates the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hobby 
Lobby case in detail, section-by-section, and summarizes the 
numerous court determinations that led to that case. The discussion 
begins with the district court’s denial of Hobby Lobby’s request that 
the court stay the individual mandate, and ends with the Supreme 
Court’s decision issued on the last day of its October 2013 term. In 
fact, the steps between these two decisions are many. The case went 
from the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (where 
Hobby Lobby asked for a preliminary injunction), to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals (where that decision was affirmed), to the United 
States Supreme Court (where Hobby Lobby’s appeal was summarily 
denied) back to the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc (where the Tenth 
Circuit urged the district court to issue the preliminary injunction), 
back to the district court (where the judge reversed himself and issued 
the injunction), and finally to the Supreme Court (where Hobby 
Lobby emerged victorious). 
Part IV begins by concluding that the Court reached the correct 
legal decision in the case considering: (1) the important place 
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religious exercise holds in the fabric of America, today and 
historically; (2) the broad brush with which Congress painted RFRA; 
and (3) the fact that Hobby Lobby’s employees will still receive all 
twenty FDA-approved contraceptives at no cost. The discussion then 
moves to the ethical issues created by the Supreme Court decision. 
The three ethical dilemmas analyzed in this Part are whether 
corporations can exercise religion, whether religion trumps third-party 
rights, and whether governments have any business analyzing the 
beliefs of a religious adherent in order to better craft public policy. 
The Article concludes with a call for further research into potential 
answers to these and other ethical dilemmas, keeping in mind that 
Hobby Lobby is just the first shoe to drop in the fight between 
religious freedom and the ACA. 
I 
THE BACKGROUND: HOBBY LOBBY’S AND HHS’ SIDES OF THE 
STORY 
Both sides in a legal dispute have a story to tell. Too often these 
stories are glossed over or neglected completely as lawyers, 
government officials, pundits, and the public rush to assess a case’s 
legal implications. This race to analyze the law often brushes off the 
actual people involved in the litigation and their important personal 
interests. The following two Sections take the time to flesh out the 
stories on both sides of this important case beginning with Hobby 
Lobby and its founder, David Green. This discussion is important 
because these stories add context, nuance, and life to often tedious 
and stale legal issues, as well as help each side make its legal case. 
For example, the law requires that a plaintiff, who accuses the 
government of burdening religious exercise, possess a sincerely held 
religious belief.1 Hobby Lobby’s story makes clear that its founder 
and controlling shareholders, with little doubt, are sincere Christians 
and desire to inculcate their religious values and beliefs into their 
company’s culture.2 The law also requires that the government have a 
 
1 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 n.28 (2014) 
(reiterating that “[t]o qualify for RFRA’s protection, an asserted belief must be ‘sincere’” 
(citation omitted)). 
2 The federal government does not contest the sincerity of Hobby Lobby’s controlling 
shareholders. Brief for Petitioners at 8, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (“The Greens maintain the sincere religious conviction ‘that 
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compelling interest before it mandates actions that restrict religious 
freedom.3 The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) 
story demonstrates the government’s compelling interest in reducing 
the cost of contraceptives for women of childbearing age, who have 
historically paid much more for preventive care than men, and who 
use contraceptives far more when they are low or no cost.4 The 
government also has an interest in equalizing the workplace playing 
field for women by giving them more access to control of their 
reproductive lives, as well as reducing the number of unwanted 
pregnancies and abortions. 
A. The Plaintiff’s Story: The Green Family and the Vocational Call to 
Exercise Religion at Work 
David Green grew up poor in Altus, Oklahoma.5 His family 
resided in a two-bedroom house; his parents took one room, his three 
sisters took the other, and David slept with his brothers on rollaway 
beds in the kitchen.6 His father was the pastor of a local church, and 
the family struggled to make ends meet.7 Green recounted: 
[T]here were plenty of times our cupboards were bare. If company 
was coming, we would stock the fridge with “leftovers”—we’d put 
tinfoil over empty cans or plates on top of empty bowls, as if they 
were full. Folks had enough worries. No need to make them worry 
about the preacher’s family.8 
He was not much of a student (having to repeat seventh grade), but 
was able to wrangle an internship with a local five-and-dime store for 
high school credit.9 As he swept the floors and stocked shelves, Green 
became intimately familiar with how the store worked.10 The child of 
 
human life begins at conception,’ that is, ‘when sperm fertilizes an egg.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (2012) (“Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest . . . .”). 
4 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 50 (quoting Senator Diane Feinstein who recited 
the statistic that “[w]omen of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket 
health care costs than men” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
5 David Green, The Hobby Lobby Way to Success, GUIDEPOSTS, http://www.guideposts 
.org/inspiration/inspirational-stories/how-founder-of-hobby-lobby-achieved-success (last 
visited July 3, 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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a pastor began to see how his own religious beliefs influenced his 
work ethic even at this young age. He recounted: 
By senior year I was putting in almost 40 hours a week at [the 
store]. I added to Mom’s fund for mission projects. I was able to 
buy her a dining room set, a new sofa and a refrigerator. More 
important, I discovered what I could do for the Lord—work at the 
calling he had given me with all my might.11 
In 1970, Green borrowed $600 to create Greco Products and began 
to construct miniature picture frames in his garage.12 As Greco 
Products’ frames grew in popularity, Green obtained 300 square feet 
of commercial retail space in 1972 and founded Hobby Lobby.13 The 
company has since grown from one small store in Oklahoma to more 
than 600 stores nationwide.14 Today, Hobby Lobby’s stores “average 
55,000 square feet and offer more than 67,000 crafting and home 
decor products. Hobby Lobby is listed as a major private corporation 
in Forbes [sic] and Fortunes [sic] list of America’s largest private 
companies, and . . . carries no long-term debt.”15 Hobby Lobby 
employs more than 13,000 people.16 Green manages the privately 
held company with members of his immediate family under various 
trusts.17 Green is now a self-made billionaire and ranked as the 310th 
richest person in the world according to Forbes, with a net worth of 
$4.9 billion.18 
Most importantly for this Article, the Greens organized their 
company to operate under the values that matter to them as 
 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
12 Our Company, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our_company/ (last 
visited July 3, 2014) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby Website]; Mark L. Russell, A Candid 
Interview with David Green Founder and CEO of Hobby Lobby, HIGH CALLING (Oct. 25, 
2012), http://www.thehighcalling.org/leadership/candid-interview-david-green-founder     
-and-ceo-hobby-lobby#.U7alLqhHuKY. 
13 Hobby Lobby Website, supra note 12. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See Verified Complaint at 2, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-12-1000-HE) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby Complaint]. 
The Greens also run Mardel, Inc., a Christian bookstore and education company, through 
various trusts. Id. Although Mardel was part of the lawsuit against the contraceptive 
mandate, this Article, for the sake of simplicity, focuses on Hobby Lobby exclusively. 
17 Id. (stating that Green, along with his wife Barbara Green, his son Steve Green, his 
son Mart Green, and his daughter Darsee Lett, own and operate Hobby Lobby). 
18 #310 David Green, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/profile/david-green/. 
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“committed evangelical Christians.”19 For example, Hobby Lobby is 
committed to: 
1. Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a 
manner consistent with Biblical principles. 
 *** 
2. Serving our employees and their families by establishing a work 
environment and company policies that build character, 
strengthen individuals, and nurture families. 
3. Providing a return on the owner’s investment, sharing the Lord’s 
blessings with our employees, and investing in our 
community.20 
David Green talks often about his vocational calling.21 In many 
denominations of the Christian faith, the concept of a calling is 
extremely important. The author and social critic Os Guinness 
provides an important definition of this idea: “Calling is the truth that 
God calls us to himself so decisively that everything we are, 
everything we do, and everything we have is invested with a special 
devotion, dynamism, and direction lived out as a response to his 
summons and service.”22 The concept historically was meant to 
indicate a call from God to sacred, religious service (i.e., to become a 
priest, pastor, or missionary).23 Martin Luther, a seminal character in 
the Protestant Reformation, was the first Christian leader to discuss 
the idea of a calling as it relates to secular vocations and 
occupations.24 Luther used the example of the Lord’s Prayer, which 
asks God to “give us today our daily bread,”25 and argued that God 
gives people their daily bread when people work diligently in an 
 
19 Hobby Lobby Complaint, supra note 16, at 1. 
20 Id. at 10. 
21 See, e.g., Press Release, Chad Previch, Hobby Lobby, Hobby Lobby Marks 40 Years 
of Helping Families Celebrate Life, http://www.hobbylobby.com/assets/pdf/40years 
/40years.pdf?CFID=19116044&CFTOKEN=9ca5ef41d64685e8-FF377CBC-F411-46CC  
-9E837F4869EF9F5B (last visited July 4, 2014) (quoting Green as saying, “I’ve always 
viewed retail as my calling . . . . Through our business success, we’ve been able to donate 
more than 10 percent of our income to charitable causes and employ more than 18,000 
amazing people at stores across the nation”). 
22 OS GUINNESS, THE CALL 29 (1998). 
23 Gene Edward Veith, The Doctrine of Vocation: How God Hides Himself in Human 
Work, MODERN REFORMATION, http://www.modernreformation.org/default.php?page 
=articledisplay&var2=541%20%20God%20Hides%E2%80%A6 (last visited July 4, 
2014). 
24 Id. 
25 Matthew 6:11 (New Int’l Version), available at https://www.biblegateway.com 
/passage/?search=Matthew%206:9-13. 
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economy of others working diligently.26 John Calvin, the influential 
French theologian, “held a dynamic view of calling, believing that 
every Christian has a vocational calling to serve God in the world in 
every sphere of human existence, lending a new dignity and meaning 
to ordinary work.”27 Calvin’s idea was that God requires people to 
use their talents to glorify God in all spheres of life.28 The Bible 
contemplates the concept of calling in the following verses: 
1. Nevertheless, each person should live as a believer in whatever 
situation the Lord has assigned to them, just as God has called 
them. This is the rule I lay down in all the churches.29 
2. Whatever the activity in which you engage, do it with all your 
ability . . . .30 
In summary, many Christians see their secular work as taking on 
special meaning because it reflects a believer’s devotion and 
obedience to God’s plan. As evidenced by Green’s story and 
statements, the Green family’s actions, Hobby Lobby’s values, and 
the fact that the company decided to fight this expensive and time-
consuming legal battle against the federal government, it is obvious 
that the Greens take their calling from God very seriously. Green 
stated: 
[Hobby Lobby’s] strategy is to be very bold. We tell people about 
the Good News of Jesus. We have five chaplains. We are very, very 
bold. . . . I can’t help but tell people of the greatest story ever told—
God’s love and our eternal life. We do that with our five chaplains. 
We’re very busy telling people about Christ.31 
Because of this calling, members of the Green family “believe[] 
they are obligated to run their businesses in accordance with their 
faith. Commitment to Jesus Christ and to Biblical principles is what 
gives their business endeavors meaning and purpose.”32 The company 
applies the Greens’ calling in five concrete ways: 
 
26 Veith, supra note 23. 
27 Hugh Whelchel, John Calvin’s Contribution to the Biblical Doctrine of Work, INST. 
FOR FAITH, WORK & ECON. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blog.tifwe.org/john-calvin-doctrine-of  
-work/. 
28 Id. 
29 1 Corinthians 7:17 (New Int’l Version), available at https://www.bible.com/bible 
/111/1co.7.17.niv. 
30 Ecclesiastes 9:10 (Int’l Standard Version), available at http://biblehub.com 
/ecclesiastes/9-10.htm. 
31 Russell, supra note 12. 
32 Hobby Lobby Complaint, supra note 16, at 2. 
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1. Hobby Lobby employs full time chaplains for its employees; 
2. Hobby Lobby pays employees above the minimum wage; 
3. Hobby Lobby monitors [its] products to make sure “all are 
consistent with their beliefs”; 
4. Hobby Lobby gives millions of dollars to fund Christian 
missionaries and missions around the globe; and 
5. Hobby Lobby closes stores on Sundays at the cost of millions in 
potential profits.33 
This background clarifies the sincerity of the Greens’ religious 
beliefs. Beginning with Green’s small enterprise in the 1970s, the 
Hobby Lobby story is one of a family believing that it has been called 
to operate its closely held business “in a manner consistent with 
biblical principles.”34 As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, 
these sincerely held religious beliefs play a role in the legal analysis 
discussed below in Part II. Before moving to this analysis, however, 
the next Section discusses the similarly compelling story of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (the other party to the 
case) and its desire to grant women of childbearing age more equality 
in preventive health care coverage. 
B. The Defendant’s Story: Enhancing Women’s Preventive Health 
Care 
The federal government did an admirable job defending the ACA 
and its contraceptive mandate throughout the Hobby Lobby case.35 
The government told its story on both a macro- and micro-level. On 
the macro-level, forty-four to forty-seven million Americans found 
themselves without health insurance prior to the ACA’s enactment in 
2010.36 These uninsured people were not the poorest of the poor 
because Medicaid covers them.37 These uninsured people were also 
not seniors older than sixty-five because Medicare covers them.38 The 
 
33 Id. 
34 Hobby Lobby Website, supra note 12. 
35 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2. 
36 See, e.g., ObamaCare Facts: Affordable Care Act, Health Insurance Marketplace, 
OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com (last visited July 6, 2014). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2012) (authorizing the Medicaid health insurance 
program). 
38 See id. § 1395c (authorizing the Medicare program, which “provides basic protection 
against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care  
. . . for . . . individuals who are age 65 or over”). 
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vast majority of these millions of uninsured people were the working 
poor or, as one commentator put it: 
[The people] . . . who have the kind of lousy jobs that don’t come 
with employer-subsidized health insurance benefits, and those with 
pre-existing conditions who cannot get affordable coverage in a 
system that is based on pure free-market principles, and various 
other groups that fell through the cracks of the status quo hodge-
podge that we call the U.S. “system” of health insurance.39 
In a nutshell, the ACA was intended to incentivize uninsured 
people to obtain what would become more affordable health 
insurance. 
The ACA was also intended to create a more uniform, 
comprehensive, and efficient insurance system throughout the 
nation.40 Greater access to care, as a result of being insured under this 
comprehensive structure, “has been shown to reduce mortality, 
improve mental health, and improve self-reported health status.”41 
The system that the ACA created has many worthy benefits to 
Americans such as: (1) small business tax credits to offset insurance 
costs42 and controls on large increases in insurance premiums;43 (2) 
stronger protections against health care fraud;44 (3) mandatory 
 
39 Eric Black, Too Many Obamacare Critics Seem Oblivious to Law’s Real Purpose, 
MINNPOST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2013/10/too-many      
-obamacare-critics-seem-oblivious-laws-real-purpose. 
40 This was the government’s first argument put forth in the Hobby Lobby case. Brief 
for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 38 (“The Affordable Care Act and its preventive-services 
coverage provision advance the compelling interest in ensuring a ‘comprehensive 
insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
41 Jason Furman, Six Economic Benefits of the Affordable Care Act, WHITE HOUSE 
(Feb. 6, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/02/06/six-economic        
-benefits-affordable-care-act. 
42 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2012). 
43 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Health Insurance Market Rules; Rate 
Review; Final Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 150 (Feb. 27, 2013) (showing the final rule 
and discussing the statutory requirement that the federal government, along with the states, 
monitor premium increases in health insurance coverage). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012). 
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice— 
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or 
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or 
control of, any health care benefit program, 
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coverage even if patients have preexisting conditions;45 (4) coverage 
for young adults under a parent’s plan until the age of twenty-six;46 
(5) more robust Medicare47 and Medicaid programs (including lower 
prescription drug prices for some Medicare beneficiaries);48 and, most 
importantly for the Hobby Lobby case, (6) free preventive services 
including cost-free access to contraceptives for women.49 
It was this cost-free contraceptive mandate that the government 
honed in on to tell its micro-level story. It is not difficult to persuade 
someone of the strong public health rationale for women to be able to 
control whether or when they become pregnant. This freedom allows 
women to participate more fully in the workforce and choose an 
appropriate time to start a family. Additionally, evidence suggests that 
half of all pregnancies in the United States are unplanned.50 It stands 
to reason that the use of contraceptives will reduce this high number 
of unintended pregnancies, which cost American taxpayers upwards 
of $11 billion per year.51 It further stands to reason that fewer 
 
in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or 
services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both. 
Id. § 1347(a). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (stating, subject to certain conditions, “each health 
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in 
a State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such 
coverage”); id. § 300gg-3 (stating that a “group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any preexisting 
condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage”); id. § 300gg-4(a) (requiring 
that group health plans and health insurance issuers may not condition eligibility for 
insurance on certain health-related factors). 
46 Id. § 300gg-14(a) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group 
or individual health insurance coverage that provides dependent coverage of children shall 
continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until the child turns 26 years 
of age.”). 
47 See, e.g., id. § 1396d. 
48 See, e.g., id. § 1395w-114a. 
49 Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4). See generally Benefits of ObamaCare: Advantage of 
ObamaCare, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/benefitsofobamacare.php 
(last visited July 6, 2014) (discussing in plain English the benefits stemming from the 
ACA). 
50 See, e.g., Press Release, Bill Albert, The Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen and 
Unplanned Pregnancy, Institute of Medicine Report on Clinical Preventive Services for 
Women: A Statement from the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned 
Pregnancy (July 19, 2011), available at https://thenationalcampaign.org/press-release 
/institute-medicine-report-clinical-preventive-services-women. 
51 Id. (finding that, in addition to direct medical costs, unintended pregnancy “imposes 
burdens on individuals and families, as well as considerable social and economic costs to 
society”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 46–47. 
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unwanted pregnancies will lower the number of abortions performed 
each year (the United States averages 1.21 million abortions annually, 
and 4 out of every 10 unintended pregnancies are aborted).52 In the 
end, the government argued, increasing women’s access to 
contraceptives will help women better compete in the workforce, 
allow women to control whether and when they become pregnant, 
reduce health care costs, and reduce the number of abortions in 
America. 
Finally, from the cost perspective, there is evidence that women 
between the ages of nineteen and forty-four “spent 70 percent more 
per capita than did males in the same age group [on personal health 
care]. This is the largest measured difference of any age-group, 
largely due to the costs associated with maternity care.”53 This higher 
cost structure leads many women to avoid or delay medical tests, 
medical treatments, and filling prescriptions.54 The government set 
out to equalize the health care playing field via the cost-free 
contraceptive mandate. 
The government’s story demonstrates both a macro-level 
compelling interest in a uniform, national health care system, and a 
micro-level compelling interest in ensuring that women have cost-free 
access to all FDA-approved contraceptives. Though the government 
made both arguments in the Hobby Lobby case, the micro-level 
contraceptive access argument, as applied to closely held 
corporations, played the biggest role in the Supreme Court decision.55 
Therefore, this Article will focus on that aspect of the ACA as 
opposed to the big picture, structural components of the law. With 
both sides’ stories on the table, Part II summarizes the law 
 
52 Abortions in America: Incidence of Abortion, OPERATION RESCUE, http://www 
.operationrescue.org/about-abortion/abortions-in-america/ (last visited July 7, 2014). 
53 U.S. Personal Health Care Spending by Age and Gender: 2010 Highlights, CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and   
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/2010 
AgeandGenderHighlights.pdf (last visited July 6, 2014). 
54 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 49–50. 
55 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). (“[The 
government] asserts that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests, 
but many of these are couched in very broad terms, such as promoting ‘public health’ and 
‘gender equality.’ . . . RFRA, however, contemplates a ‘more focused’ inquiry . . . [which] 
requires us to ‘loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests’ and to ‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted 
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants’—in other words, to 
look to the marginal interest in enforcing the contraceptive mandate in these cases.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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surrounding this case beginning with protection of religious freedom 
and moving to the specific legal requirements revolving around the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate. 
II 
THE LAW SURROUNDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HEALTH CARE 
Part I focused on the idea that each side in a legal dispute has a 
story to tell, and that these stories are too often neglected in judicial 
opinions. This neglect depersonalizes the litigants and their stake in a 
case. In this case, Hobby Lobby’s side of the story goes all the way 
back to the childhood of its founder David Green to show how his 
religious convictions shaped his calling, or his religiously-inspired 
approach, to his chosen vocation. More than forty years later, Green’s 
small, garage-based picture frame business is now a national retail 
chain. Hobby Lobby—a closely held corporation with nearly 600 
stores and more than 13,000 employees—makes a sincere and serious 
attempt to inculcate Christian values into its corporate mission and 
daily business life. 
On the other side of the docket, the U.S. Department of Heath and 
Human Services tells a story of a nation groaning under the weight of 
increasing and unaffordable health care costs. The ACA granted forty 
million uninsured Americans the opportunity and incentive to 
purchase what will hopefully become affordable health insurance. 
The law is also designed to help all Americans receive more robust 
health insurance at a lower price. The federal government’s side of 
the story hones in on the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and its ability 
to decrease the inequities disfavoring women in health care. No-cost 
contraceptives will decrease the number of unwanted pregnancies and 
abortions and will help women fully participate in the workforce by 
being able to better control their reproductive lives. 
Part II of this Article moves from the litigants’ stories to the legal 
principles that determined which side prevailed. This Part begins with 
a brief sketch of religious freedom in early America. This background 
provides context for an evaluation of how the constitutional 
protections of religious freedom (i.e., the First Amendment and its 
interpretation by the courts) and statutory protections of religious 
freedom (i.e., RFRA and the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized 
Persons Act) developed. The final Section in Part II evaluates the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate and the requirements it places on 
certain for-profit corporations to provide cost-free access to twenty 
different forms of FDA-approved birth control. The litigants’ personal 
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stories will mix in with the legal realities of the case to form an 
interesting discussion in Part III, which evaluates the litigation of this 
case from the filing of Hobby Lobby’s complaint in a federal district 
court in Oklahoma, to resolution in the United States Supreme Court. 
A. Religious Freedom in America: A Brief Sketch 
Religious freedom in America has been both an important 
component of daily life weaved into the social fabric of the nation and 
a controversial subject in its application, implementation, and scope. 
Many seventeenth century settlers from Europe were religious people 
fleeing religious persecution in their homeland.56 These migrants, 
often employing the machinery of colonial and state government, 
protected and promoted their favored religion while often meddling in 
the lives of those with different religions or no religion at all. 
Freedom to believe as one wished about religion—otherwise known 
as freedom of conscience—was a concept that carried little weight in 
the 1600s. However, the idea began to resonate with Americans as 
time passed and the nation matured. This Section briefly traces how 
freedom of conscience became protected in American society, from 
its toehold in the seventeenth century, to its codification in the first 
words of the Constitution’s First Amendment near the end of the 
eighteenth century. This background allows for a more contextualized 
evaluation of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the First 
Amendment and RFRA as well as its treatment of religious freedom 
in later sections. 
1. Early Americans: Religious Persecution by Groups Seeking 
Religious Freedom in the New World 
The earliest European settlers in the New World were generally 
Christians of different denominations, such as Puritans, 
Congregationalists, Quakers, Baptists, and Methodists, who escaped 
their old homes in search of new religious freedom. For many, this 
emigration gave settlers the freedom to practice their religion more 
 
56 Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, America as a Religious 
Refuge: The Seventeenth Century, Part 1, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov 
/exhibits/religion/rel01.html (last visited July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Library of Congress: 
Religion Part 1] (“Many of the British North American colonies that eventually formed 
the United States of America were settled in the seventeenth century by men and women, 
who, in the face of European persecution, refused to compromise passionately held 
religious convictions and fled Europe.”). 
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freely and with fewer governmental roadblocks. In fact, several of the 
original colonies were “established as havens for specific sects and 
denominations”57 or “plantations of religion.”58 However, even while 
members of these growing societies practiced their faith in daily life 
more freely than they had in Europe, they also fought bitterly against 
other community members who held different theological beliefs.59 
Early religious and political leaders thought that a uniform system of 
belief was necessary “to nurture and preserve political unity within a 
nation.”60 Ironically, and “[a]lthough they were victims of religious 
persecution in Europe, the [early settlers] supported the Old World 
theory that sanctioned [them], the need for uniformity of religion in 
the state.”61 Support for this theory meant that, in the earliest 
moments of American history, there was little to no protection for an 
individual’s freedom of conscience when it came to religion.62 
A few examples elucidate this religious discrimination in early 
America. The most famous religious nonconformists within the 
Puritan community, Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, were 
banished following disagreements over theology and policy.63 From 
Puritan Boston’s earliest days, “Catholics (‘Papists’) were anathema 
and were banned from the colonies, along with other non-Puritans. 
Four Quakers were hanged in Boston between 1659 and 1661 for 
persistently returning to the city to stand up for their beliefs.”64 The 
 
57 Gordon Smith, Protecting the Weak: Religious Liberty in the Twenty-First Century, 
1999 BYU L. REV. 479, 486 (reproducing a speech by U.S. senator from Oregon Gordon 
Smith). 
58 Library of Congress: Religion Part 1, supra note 56. 
59 Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Oct. 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-history-of         
-religious-tolerance-61312684/ (“From the earliest arrival of Europeans on America’s 
shores, religion has often been a cudgel, used to discriminate, suppress and even kill the 
foreign, the ‘heretic’ and the ‘unbeliever’—including the ‘heathen’ natives already here. 
Moreover, while it is true that the vast majority of early-generation Americans were 
Christian, the pitched battles between various Protestant sects and, more explosively, 
between Protestants and Catholics, present an unavoidable contradiction to the widely held 
notion that America is a ‘Christian nation.’”). 
60 Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-Care Providers’ Rights of Conscience in 
American Law: Present, Past, and Future, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 7 (2010). 
61 Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, America as a Religious 
Refuge: The Seventeenth Century, Part 2, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov 
/exhibits/religion/rel01-2.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
62 See Wardle, supra note 60, at 7. 
63 Smith, supra note 57, at 486–87. Williams went on to found the Rhode Island colony 
“upon the principles of freedom of conscience and complete separation of church and 
state.” Id. at 487. 
64 Davis, supra note 59. 
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idea that one could freely exercise a religion different from the 
community norm could be considered heresy—often punishable by 
death. 
On the political front, colonial and state governments often 
enforced the religious intolerance of the majority under penalty of 
law. For example, the Massachusetts colonial government limited its 
officeholders to Christians.65 Catholics were banned from public 
office in New York State from 1777 to 1806, while Maryland granted 
full rights to Catholics but not to Jews.66 “Delaware required an oath 
affirming belief in the Trinity. Several states, including Massachusetts 
and South Carolina, had official, state-supported churches.”67 Some 
colonial governments taxed citizens, sometimes against their will, to 
support religious causes. The taxes were owed regardless of whether 
the taxpayer supported the favored religion (though taxpayers were 
often allowed to select which church to support).68 People were 
expected to attend public worship ceremonies and avoid disparaging 
the majority’s religion.69 Though there were voices crying out against 
the suppression of free religious exercise in the 1600s (and even a few 
state laws regarding the “tolerance of other religions”), true progress 
toward religious freedom would not occur until the following 
century.70 
2. Freedom of Conscience Gains Significant Ground 
Beginning in the seventeenth century, Americans began to express 
their opposition to government support of religion and the lack of 
freedom of religious conscience. Dissidents argued that freedom to 
exercise one’s chosen religion is a natural, unalienable right, and 
governments should not force people to support religion by sanction 
of law. For example, in 1779, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Virginia 
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, which guaranteed equality to 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–63 (1879). 
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., Maryland Toleration Act (Sept. 21, 1649), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/maryland_toleration.asp (mandating tolerance 
against Trinitarian Christians while also allowing capital punishment for anyone who 
denied the deity of Jesus). 
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all Virginia citizens regardless of religion.71 The bill, which passed in 
1786, stated: 
We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or 
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or 
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on 
account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be 
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in 
matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, 
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.72 
James Madison was another strong believer in the unalienable right 
of religious freedom.73 Madison’s home state of Virginia was one of 
the first states to include religious freedom in an official declaration 
of individual rights. In fact, Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights 
was a model for the federal Bill of Rights.74 Madison successfully 
advocated that the language in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, 
initially written to protect the “fullest toleration in the exercise of 
religion,” should instead provide more robustly that “all men are 
entitled to the full and free exercise of religion.”75 
Later, in 1785, Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments76 provided a fifteen-point defense of religious 
liberty, which one commentator later called “the most powerful 
defense of religious liberty ever written in America.”77 Arguing 
against a Virginia state bill that would have levied a tax to support 
 
71 An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), available at 
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/An_Act_for_establishing_religious_Freedom_1786. 
72 Id. § II. 
73 See Wardle, supra note 60, at 7–8. 
74 Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), BILL OF RIGHTS INST., http://billofrights 
institute.org/resources/educator-resources/americapedia/americapedia-documents/va          
-declaration-rights/ (last visited July 20, 2014) (discussing the influence of the Declaration 
of Rights on James Madison—the primary author of the Bill of Rights). 
75 Joseph Loconte, James Madison and Religious Liberty, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 16, 
2001), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/03/james-madison-and-religious       
-liberty (“Madison didn’t like it. He objected to [fellow Virginian George] Mason’s use of 
the word ‘toleration’ because it implied that the exercise of faith was a gift from 
government, not an inalienable right. Madison’s substitute—‘all men are entitled to the 
full and free exercise’ of religion—essentially won the day. This put Madison far ahead of 
John Locke, who generally mustered no more than grudging toleration for religious 
belief.”); see also VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html. 
76 See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (June 20, 1785), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders 
/documents/amendI_religions43.html. 
77 Loconte, supra note 75 (quoting biographer Irving Brant). 
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Christian teachers, Madison contended that it is improper for the 
government to embrace religion. He wrote that “[t]he Religion then of 
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every . . . 
man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an 
unalienable right.”78 Madison believed strongly that 
freedom of conscience—meaning belief or conviction about 
religious matters—[was] the centerpiece of all civil liberties. He 
called religious belief “precedent, both in order of time and in 
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.” By placing 
freedom of conscience prior to and superior to all other rights, 
Madison gave it the strongest political foundation possible.79 
By 1789, twelve of the original thirteen states had protections for 
religious freedom in their constitutions.80 Many states also began to 
provide accommodations for people who had religious reasons for not 
complying with a particular law. For example, “[v]irtually all states 
by 1789 allowed Quakers to testify or vote by an affirmation rather 
than an oath [and] several colonies had exempted Quakers and 
Mennonites from service in the militia.”81 However, this movement 
toward greater freedom to exercise religion was not expressly 
incorporated into the seven articles of the Constitution. The framers 
believed that such protection from government interference with 
religion was unnecessary because the federal government was not 
granted power in the Constitution to meddle with religion.82 This 
conclusion was a nearsighted omission that angered many states and 
nearly stopped the constitutional ratification process in its tracks.83 In 
response, the first Congress debated and passed the First Amendment 
(and the other nine amendments making up the Bill of Rights) to 
 
78 MADISON, supra note 76. 
79 Loconte, supra note 75. 
80 Thomas C. Berg, Free Exercise of Religion, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage 
.org/constitution#!/amendments/1/essays/139/free-exercise-of-religion (last visited July 
22, 2014). 
81 Id. 
82 See About the First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., http://www.first 
amendmentcenter.org/about-the-first-amendment (last visited July 22, 2014) (“When the 
U.S. Constitution was signed on Sept. 17, 1787, it did not contain the essential freedoms 
now outlined in the Bill of Rights, because many of the Framers viewed their inclusion as 
unnecessary.”). 
83 The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 4, 2002), 
https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_immigrants-rights 
/bill-rights-brief-history. 
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placate some of these dissenting states and avoid a second 
Constitutional Convention.84 
3. Freedom of Religion Comes Full Circle: The First Amendment 
The First Amendment’s leading words demark the boundaries of 
the government as it deals with the intermingling of religion and 
American public life: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof         
. . . .”85 The Hobby Lobby case deals with the Free Exercise Clause, 
or the second clause in the sentence: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”86 Though the text of the 
Free Exercise Clause is absolute—“Congress shall make no law”—
the Supreme Court has not interpreted it as such. Instead, the Court 
has 
place[d] some limits on the exercise of religion. For example, courts 
would not hold that the First Amendment protects human sacrifice 
even if some religion required it. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this clause so that the freedom to believe is absolute, but 
the ability to act on those beliefs is not.87 
Note that the Amendment’s language refers to “Congress” passing 
laws concerning religion and not state governments. Until the mid-
1900s, this technical reading meant that states could pass laws 
restricting a person’s religious freedom unless the state’s own 
constitution prohibited such legislation. That interpretation changed in 
1940 when the Supreme Court held, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, that 
the First Amendment applied to laws emanating from states as well.88 
The Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause was a part of (or 
 
84 Cf. Creating the United States: Demand for a Bill of Rights, LIBRARY OF CONG., 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/demand-for-a-bill-of-rights.html 
(last visited July 22, 2014) (“Fastening on Anti-Federalist criticisms that the Constitution 
lacked a clear articulation of guaranteed rights, Madison proposed amendments that 
emphasized the rights of individuals rather than the rights of states . . . .”). 
85 U.S. CONST. amend I, § 1. 
86 Id. 
87 Claire Mullally, Free-Exercise Clause Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Sept. 16, 
2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/free-exercise-clause; see also Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were 
a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil 
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife 
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead 
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her 
belief into practice?”). 
88 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
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incorporated into) the “liberty” component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.89 The next few Sections discuss 
how free exercise cases arise and how the Supreme Court and 
Congress have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause when 
adjudicating these issues. This discussion will lead to an analysis of 
Congress’ response to a particular Supreme Court case through 
RFRA. 
4. How Free Exercise Cases Generally Arise 
Free Exercise cases under the First Amendment generally arise 
when a person, or a group of people, is required by a particular law to 
act in contradiction to his or her religious beliefs. A major issue of 
contention for the courts in these cases is that the Constitution does 
not define the term “religion” or the phrase “free exercise of 
[religion].” The broad wording makes it difficult to ascertain, for 
example, when a religious adherent should be granted an exemption 
from a generally applicable law. These dilemmas force courts to 
cobble together some sort of definition of religion in each case and 
place some outer bounds on what it means for a person to exercise 
religion. The general result has been as follows: first, courts tend to 
credit a religious adherent’s definition of religion in any particular 
case. Courts, however, look at whether a person’s religious beliefs are 
sincere. Judges attempt to test sincerity, although this sincerity 
analysis makes courts nervous because of the potential for 
entanglement with religion.90 Second, courts are reluctant to inquire 
into whether a person’s interpretation of a religious tenet is accurate. 
Interpretive accuracy is seen as a religious issue between the adherent 
and the religion. Courts do not require a person’s belief to be an 
accurate portrayal of a requirement from a religious text, for 
example.91 Third, courts are reluctant to inquire into how central a 
 
89 Id. at 303 (“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [the Fourteenth] 
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . The 
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws.”). 
90 See, e.g., Lineker v. State, No. A-8957, 2006 WL 2847849 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 4, 
2006) (denying a Free Exercise Clause case brought by a couple who doused themselves 
in extracted marijuana liquid as part of an alleged religious ritual). 
91 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 
(1981) (refusing to second-guess the religious beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness employee 
who refused to work on the production of tanks for religious reasons but agreed to work as 
a sheet fabricator producing steel for tanks). 
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religious tenet is to a particular religious denomination. Again, 
whether a religious tenant is of greatest importance to a denomination 
is seen as a religious issue between the adherent and the religion.92 
Finally, courts will give more credit to laws of general applicability 
than they will to laws that target religion. This deference is because 
legislative bodies need to be able to pass laws to make society 
function and to protect the public without worrying about a myriad of 
exemptions for religious adherents.93 
The remainder of this Section discusses how the Supreme Court 
has interpreted and tweaked the Free Exercise Clause from the 
adoption of the First Amendment to the landmark case of Employment 
Division v. Smith94 in 1990 in which the Court effected a sea change 
in free exercise jurisprudence. The discussion then moves to 
Congress’ responses to the Smith decision. It is important to keep an 
eye on how the history of religious freedom in America influenced 
these decisions and statutes. The following Section will begin with 
coverage of the major Supreme Court cases before turning attention to 
RFRA. 
B. Pre-Smith Law 
The Smith decision is the most important and controversial free 
exercise case prior to the Hobby Lobby decision.95 In Smith, the Court 
radically departed from the precedent it had crafted beginning in 1879 
and tweaked until 1990. This early line of precedent will be referred 
to in this Article as pre-Smith law. This Article will delve deeper into 
the Smith case in Part II.C and Congress’ response to the decision in 
Part II.D. This Section, however, evaluates how the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Free Exercise Clause up until 1990. 
1. A Narrow Interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause: Separating 
Religious Belief from Religious Practice 
The Supreme Court’s first definitive statement on the Free Exercise 
Clause arrived in Reynolds v. United States.96 In Reynolds, the 
Justices distinguished between religious belief (which the Court found 
 
92 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the 
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the 
validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”). 
93 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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was absolutely protected from governmental interference under the 
Free Exercise Clause) and religious conduct (which the Court held is 
often, but not always, protected from governmental interference).97 
The case revolved around an interesting set of facts at an intriguing 
time in American history. In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Anti-
Bigamy Act, primarily to curb the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints’ (or the Mormon Church’s) practice of polygamy.98 
George Reynolds, a Mormon living in the Utah Territory and a high-
ranking official in the Mormon Church, took a second wife and 
claimed the practice was an accepted religious doctrine of the 
Mormon Church. Reynolds believed: 
it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances 
permitting, to practise [sic] polygamy; . . . that this duty was 
enjoined by different books which the members of said church 
believed to be of divine origin, and among others the Holy Bible, 
and also that the members of the church believed that the practice of 
polygamy was directly enjoined upon the male members thereof by 
the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph Smith, the founder and 
prophet of said church; that the failing or refusing to practise [sic] 
polygamy by such male members of said church, when 
circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the penalty 
for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to 
come.99 
Reynolds’ argument, in essence, was that taking a second wife was 
a religious obligation and would save his soul from eternal 
damnation. In spite of potentially condemning Reynolds for eternity, 
the government charged him under anti-polygamy law, and the 
Supreme Court upheld Reynolds’ conviction, as well as the statute, 
under the Free Exercise Clause.100 In reaching this decision, the Court 
noted that the word “religion” is left undefined in the Constitution 
and, therefore, the Justices were forced to evaluate what the term 
 
97 Id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
98 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (punishing polygamy 
with a fine up to $500 and a maximum five-year prison sentence). See generally Jeremy 
Byellin, Today in 1862: The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act Was Signed into Law, THOMSON 
REUTERS (July 8, 2011), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research 
/today-in-1862-the-morrill-anti-bigamy-act-was-signed-into-law/ (discussing how 
President Lincoln allowed the Mormon Church to ignore the anti-bigamy law in return for 
remaining neutral during the Civil War; this waiver ended, however, after the war when 
Congress gave the federal government more power to enforce the law). 
99 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. 
100 Id. at 168. 
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meant in the historical context surrounding when the First 
Amendment was adopted.101 This historical exercise led the Court to 
proclaim: 
[I]t may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of 
the Union when polygamy has not been an offence [sic] against 
society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or 
less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to 
believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was 
intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important 
feature of social life.102 
In other words, the historical criminalization of polygamy in the 
United States (and in England before that) strongly indicated that the 
Free Exercise Clause tolerated governmental interference with the 
practice (but not interference with the belief in the practice), even if 
polygamous marriages were undertaken for religious reasons.103 In 
the end, the important precedent from Reynolds today is that the 
government cannot interfere with a person’s religious belief, but civil 
authorities are “left free to reach actions . . . in violation of social 
duties or subversive of good order.”104 This principle is often referred 
to as the belief/action distinction.105 
The Court’s narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause does 
not give a religious adherent many defenses to generally applicable 
laws that apply to the religious and nonreligious alike.106 In fact, the 
Reynolds’ free exercise test is a quasi-rational basis test (called 
“quasi” in this Article because the Court did not identify it as such), 
meaning that the government may prohibit religious action as long as 
it has a rational basis for doing so.107 This is a fairly easy legal 
standard for the government to meet in most cases. Therefore, using 
 
101 Id. at 162 (“The word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution. We must go 
elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, 
than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The 
precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed.”). 
102 Id. at 165. 
103 See id. at 167 (“To permit [polygamy among members of the Mormon Church] 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”). 
104 Id. at 164. 
105 See, e.g., Davison M. Douglas, Belief-Action Distinction in Free Exercise Clause 
History, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 29, 2011), http://uscivilliberties.org/historical            
-overview/3186-beliefaction-distinction-in-free-exercise-clause-history.html. 
106 The Court has also taken this approach in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
107 See Mullally, supra note 87. 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
2014] Religious Freedom and Closely Held Corporations: The  283 
Hobby Lobby Case and Its Ethical Implications 
this approach, “the courts generally rejected religious-freedom claims 
against generally applicable laws” for almost a century after 
Reynolds.108 
2. A More Recent, Expansive Interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause: The Warren Court and the Strict Scrutiny Test 
The Reynolds approach “was employed from 1878 until 1963 to 
uphold the anti-polygamy laws,109 the social security laws,110 military 
conscription laws,111 Sunday closing laws,112 social security 
identification requirements,113 federal oversight of federal lands,114 
prison regulations,115 and state taxation of products sold by a 
religious organization.”116 Fast forward to the 1960s when, during the 
Warren Court era, the Supreme Court read the Free Exercise Clause 
more expansively. A new broader standard arrived in 1963 with the 
Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner.117 
Adeil Sherbert, a recent convert to the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church, worked in South Carolina as a textile mill operator.118 Her 
new religion prohibited her from working on Saturdays, “the Sabbath 
Day of her faith.”119 The mill moved to a six-day workweek two 
years after Sherbert’s conversion and subsequently fired her because 
she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons.120 She sought 
other work compatible with her religious principles and, finding none, 
applied for unemployment benefits under the South Carolina 
Unemployment Act.121 This Act required an applicant for benefits to: 
 
108 Id. 
109 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145. 
110 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
111 Gillette, 401 U.S. 437. 
112 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
113 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
114 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
115 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
116 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); 
Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, 
the Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1675 (2011). 
117 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
118 Id. at 399 n.1. 
119 Id. at 399. 
120 Id. at 399, 399 n.1. 
121 Id. at 399–400. Sherbert was an incorporation case because the Supreme Court 
decided the constitutionality of a state law under the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 401. 
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(1) be able to work, and (2) be available for work.122 The law also 
ruled an applicant ineligible if she turned down suitable work when 
offered.123 The state argued that Sherbert’s self-imposed restriction 
concerning work on Saturdays made her ineligible because she failed, 
without good cause, “to accept suitable work when offered.”124 The 
state denied her benefits because, according to the South Carolina 
Employment Security Commission, her beliefs were not good enough 
cause to fail to accept suitable work.125 Sherbert appealed to the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, which upheld the decision because 
the Commission’s “construction of the statute place[d] no restriction 
upon the appellant’s freedom of religion nor [did] it in any way 
prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her 
religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.”126 
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the state’s denial of 
benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. In a 7-2 opinion, Justice 
Brennan affirmed the holding in Reynolds that a person’s religious 
beliefs must be protected from government interference claiming that 
“[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against 
any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”127 He also 
reiterated the idea proffered by the Court in Reynolds that a person’s 
religious actions are not per se off limits from governmental 
interference.128 Justice Brennan argued that the government is often 
allowed to step in when a person’s “conduct or actions so regulated 
have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace 
or order.”129 Justice Brennan then crafted a test, now known as the 
Sherbert test, to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause will bar 
governmental inference with religious action: 
1. The plaintiff must hold a sincere religious belief. As mentioned 
earlier, disproving sincere religious belief is difficult and, in 
many cases, the government does not contest the first prong of 
the test at trial.130 
 
122 Id. at 400 n.3 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-113(3) (1962)). 
123 Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)). 
124 Id. at 401. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 402 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
128 Id. at 403. 
129 Id. 
130 E.g., id. at 399 n.1 (“No question has been raised in this case concerning the 
sincerity of appellant’s religious beliefs. Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against 
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2. The party challenging the federal or state law must prove that the 
law at issue substantially burdens religious exercise.131 The law 
may only pose an indirect burden but, if that burden impedes the 
observance of religion or discriminates “invidiously” between 
religions, it is suspect under the Free Exercise Clause.132 It is 
important to look to whether the plaintiff is compelled to violate 
her religion in order to follow the law.133 
3. If the plaintiff is substantially burdened, the government must 
show that it has a compelling interest that justifies the 
substantial burden on religious exercise.134 The Court expressly 
revoked the quasi-rational basis test from Reynolds because of 
the high sensitivity and importance of a person’s religious belief 
under the American system.135 
4. The government should also proffer “alternative forms of 
regulation [which] would combat . . . abuses without infringing 
First Amendment rights.”136 The Sherbert test is essentially a 
balancing test between the state’s interest and the burden on the 
sincere religious adherent. 
Many commentators mistakenly add another requirement to the 
Sherbert test: the government must prove that its law burdens 
religious freedom in the “least restrictive” manner possible to achieve 
its compelling interest.137 More accurately, the Court in Sherbert 
required the government to show alternative regulations, but the law 
does not need to be the least restrictive means possible of achieving 
its goals. 
The majority applied the test to Sherbert’s case and found in her 
favor.138 First, she held a sincere religious belief that her religion 
banned work on the Sabbath (in her case, Saturdays).139 Second, the 
 
Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed, based upon that 
religion’s interpretation of the Holy Bible.”). 
131 Id. at 403. 
132 Id. at 403–04 (citation omitted). 
133 Id. at 404. 
134 Id. at 406. 
135 Id. (“It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable 
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation . . . .’” 
(citation omitted)). 
136 Id. at 407. 
137 See, e.g., James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 
VA. L. REV. 2053, 2057 (2009); Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA 
Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 79 (1996). 
138 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408–10. 
139 Id. at 399 n.1. 
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South Carolina law substantially infringed her free exercise rights 
granted under the Constitution by compelling her to choose between 
her religious beliefs and her unemployment benefits.140 At this point, 
for the government to have won the case, it had to prove that a 
compelling interest existed in denying Sherbet benefits. The Court 
held that the government’s proffered interests in reducing fraudulent 
withdrawals from the unemployment fund and preventing fraudulent 
religious claims that hinder employers from scheduling Saturday 
work were not compelling enough to restrict Sherbert’s free exercise 
rights.141 One can only imagine that this case would have come out 
differently had the Court employed the Reynolds test; the government 
certainly has a rational basis for combating fraud in the 
unemployment system. 
The second major pre-Smith free exercise case moved from the 
employment arena to the educational arena. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,142 
the Supreme Court addressed a state law mandating parents to send 
their children aged seven through sixteen to either a public or private 
school; homeschooling was not allowed.143 Three members of the 
Amish religion refused to send their children to school as the law 
required because of their “fundamental [religious] belief that salvation 
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world 
and worldly influence.”144 The Amish object to high school and 
higher education in general, because 
the values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values and 
the Amish way of life; they view secondary school education as an 
impermissible exposure of their children to a “worldly” influence in 
conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize 
intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, 
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other 
students. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-
doing; a life of “goodness,” rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, 
rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than 
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, 
contemporary worldly society.145 
A school district administrator filed a complaint, and the Amish 
parents “were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the 
 
140 Id. at 403–04. 
141 Id. at 406–07. 
142 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
143 See WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (1969). 
144 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. 
145 Id. at 210–11. 
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compulsory-attendance law in Green County Court and were fined the 
sum of $5 each.”146 The parents argued that the compulsory 
attendance law violated their First Amendment free exercise rights; in 
contrast, the state made a Reynolds-style argument that while the First 
Amendment protects religious beliefs, religious actions remain 
unprotected in this instance.147 The Supreme Court disagreed148 and 
reiterated that the First Amendment provides a fundamental right to 
exercise religion.149 Though this fundamental right must be balanced 
against the government’s competing interests, it is difficult to 
overcome. In other words, the free exercise of religion is so crucial 
that it can trump generally applicable laws such as mandatory school 
attendance requirements. Although not expressly stating as such, 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion applied the Sherbert test: 
1. The plaintiff must hold a sincere religious belief. The Court 
looked first to the sincerity of the parents’ beliefs, stating: “In 
evaluating those claims we must be careful to determine whether 
the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they 
claim, inseparable and interdependent.”150 The Justices wanted 
to make certain that the parents’ educational decisions were 
“rooted in religious belief” as opposed to purely secular 
concerns about state education.151 This analysis provides strong 
precedent for courts when inquiring into the sincerity of a 
religious adherent’s beliefs. 
2. The plaintiff must prove that the law at issue substantially 
burdens religious exercise.152 Finding the claims to be sincerely 
religious, the Court moved on to consider the impact of the law 
on these religious beliefs and found that impact to be substantial: 
“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ 
practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but 
inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, 
under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at 
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”153 
 
146 Id. at 208. 
147 Id. at 219 (“Wisconsin . . . argues that ‘actions,’ even though religiously grounded, 
are outside the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
148 Id. at 219–20. The vote for Yoder and the other Amish parents was unanimous; 
Justice Douglas dissented in part but voted with the majority. Id. at 241. The vote was 7-0, 
as Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
Id. at 206. 
149 Id. at 221. 
150 Id. at 215. 
151 Id. 
152 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
153 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
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3. If the plaintiff is substantially burdened, the government must 
show that it has a compelling interest that justifies the 
substantial burden on religious exercise.154 Finally, the Court 
considered the compelling interests advocated by the state. The 
Yoder opinion found that the state’s interest in educating its 
citizens was “paramount” and that “providing public schools 
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”155 But, even 
so, the Court’s balancing test concluded that Wisconsin was 
unable to overcome the Amish parents’ free exercise rights. The 
state needed more and better evidence to prove that failing to 
attend high school would create people doomed to be burdens on 
society.156 
4. The government should also proffer “alternative forms of 
regulation [which] would combat . . . abuses without infringing 
First Amendment rights.”157 This aspect of the Sherbert test was 
not addressed directly in the Yoder opinion. Although, the Court 
discussed the long-proven ability of the Amish to raise 
productive citizens and, “[a]gainst this background it would 
require a more particularized showing from the State [that 
people without high school educations are burdens on society] to 
justify the severe interference with religious freedom such 
additional compulsory attendance would entail.”158 This 
reasoning can be interpreted as requiring the government to 
adduce some alternative methods of enforcing interest. 
The bottom line from Yoder is that the values underlying the free 
exercise of religion “must be protected” and, therefore, those values 
may trump very important—even compelling—governmental 
interests.159 This ruling falls on the opposite spectrum from Reynolds, 
as the religious beliefs and actions of the Amish parents were allowed 
to contradict a law of “paramount” importance. 
Finally, there are two business-related free exercise cases from the 
Supreme Court that provide important precedent in this area. It is 
interesting to note that the for-profit businesses in both these cases 
lost, but the Court did evaluate their lawsuits under the Free Exercise 
Clause. First, in Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court held that general laws 
advancing secular goals, but indirectly burdening religion, are 
generally valid unless the government can meet its purpose with less 
impact on religious exercise.160 More specifically, the Supreme Court 
 
154 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
155 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213. 
156 See id. at 232–33. 
157 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
158 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 227. 
159 Id. at 222. 
160 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). 
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upheld a mandatory Sunday retail business closure law—meant to 
provide a day of repose for all citizens—against a Free Exercise 
Clause challenge.161 The Justices held: 
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one 
or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, 
that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be 
characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates 
conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and 
effect of which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is 
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the 
State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose 
such a burden.162 
Braunfeld introduces the “less restrictive alternatives” test (not 
quite a “least restrictive alternative” as found in RFRA) to the Free 
Exercise Clause case law. 
Second, in United States v. Lee, the Court held that comprehensive, 
general, and neutral national programs (i.e., Social Security)—which 
apply regardless of religion—must apply uniformly, must allow for 
only a few exceptions, and may trump religious freedom in the 
commercial sphere when religious adherents enter into commerce as a 
matter of choice.163 More specifically, the Court held that Social 
Security employer payroll taxes applied to an Amish carpenter who 
employed several other Amish people and had filed a free exercise 
challenge.164 The Justices held: 
[E]very person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to 
exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. 
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity 
as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as 
a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the 
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. 
Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer 
operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees.165 
 
161 Id. at 609. 
162 Id. at 607. 
163 455 U.S. 252, 261–62 (1982). 
164 Id. at 254. 
165 Id. at 261. 
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C. The Re-Narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause: The Controversial 
Case of Employment Division v. Smith 
The free exercise philosophy of Sherbert and Yoder contrasts 
greatly with Employment Division v. Smith.166 The Smith decision in 
1990 took the Court back to the Reynolds era reasoning on free 
exercise jurisprudence. In Smith, the Court rejected the Sherbert test 
and its expansive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause for the 
first time. A balancing test weighing religious freedom against 
governmental interest was no longer appropriate when judging 
generally applicable laws. 
The facts in Smith are simple. Oregon banned the possession of 
controlled substances without a prescription.167 Using federal law—
and its scheduling of drugs into different categories based on potential 
for abuse and existence of accepted use in medical treatment—the 
state criminalized the possession of peyote, which is “a hallucinogen 
derived from [a small, spineless cactus] plant.”168 Alfred Smith and 
Galen Black worked at a drug rehabilitation clinic and were 
terminated “because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at 
a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are 
members.”169 The use of controlled substances was considered 
misconduct under the terms of their employment. Both filed claims 
for unemployment compensation. The Oregon Employment Division 
deemed them ineligible for unemployment benefits because they were 
terminated for misconduct.170 Smith and Black argued that this denial 
of unemployment benefits was based on their unwillingness to forgo 
their religious beliefs to remain employed; this treatment, they 
argued, violated the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by 
Sherbert.171 
Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-3 majority (Justice Kennedy did not 
participate in the case), reemphasized the holding from Reynolds that 
the government may not meddle with a person’s religious belief.172 
This fundamental truth, Justice Scalia explained, means that a law 
may not “compel affirmation of religious belief,173 punish the 
 
166 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
167 Id. at 874 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)). 
168 Id. at 874. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 876, 878. 
172 Id. at 879. 
173 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
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expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false,174 impose 
special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious 
status,175 or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies 
over religious authority or dogma.”176 He then posited that religious 
action, since Reynolds, has been viewed as different from religious 
belief and that the First Amendment allows for some regulation. For 
example, general laws that apply equally to the religious and 
nonreligious alike and that do not target religion can trump free 
exercise rights.177 These generally applicable laws may hinder or, in 
some cases, preclude someone’s religious practice and still be 
constitutional. The majority determined that the Court must uphold 
these types of laws because broad exemptions for religious adherents 
would require constitutionally mandated 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind–ranging from compulsory military service,178 . . . 
to the payment of taxes,179 . . . to health and safety regulation[s] 
such as manslaughter and child neglect laws,180 . . . compulsory 
vaccination laws,181 . . . drug laws,182 . . .  and traffic laws[;]183 . . . 
to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws,184 . . . 
child labor laws,185 . . . animal cruelty laws,186 . . . environmental 
protection laws,187 . . . and laws providing for equality of 
opportunity for the races . . . .188 The First Amendment’s protection 
of religious liberty does not require this.189 
 
174 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944). 
175 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 
69 (1953); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). 
176 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–52 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95–119 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–25 (1976). 
177 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80. 
178 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
180 See, e.g., Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
181 See, e.g., Cude v. State, 377 SW.2d 816 (Ark. 1964). 
182 See, e.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
183 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
184 See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
185 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
186 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 
1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989); cf. State v. Massey, 51 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1949). 
187 See United States v. Little, 638 F. Supp. 337 (Mont. 1986). 
188 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983). 
189 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990). 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
292 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 259 
Without giving the government the benefit of the doubt when it 
comes to generally applicable laws, society would have a hard time 
regulating itself if religious adherents could object to any law on the 
books. This special treatment would cause the law to resemble a 
patchwork quilt with holes in many of its squares. Therefore, the 
Court held that the Sherbert test, and its strong protection of religious 
exercise, does not apply to generally applicable laws.190 The majority 
found support in the fact that the Sherbert test had only been used 
three times to invalidate governmental action as applied to religious 
adherents—all three were denials of unemployment benefits.191 The 
Sherbert test had been applied in other free exercise contexts, but the 
governmental action was always upheld.192 In the end, the Court held 
that the state of Oregon was allowed to deny unemployment benefits 
to these terminated workers.193 
Since the 1980s, the Court had been slowly whittling away at the 
Sherbert test.194 The majority in Smith placed an exclamation point 
on this trend by rejecting the test completely. This case stands out as a 
low point in the arc of free exercise law. Prior to the end of the 
twentieth century and the Smith case, or the era in which the arc of 
freedom of religion was at its apex, the government had to prove that 
statutes directly or indirectly impacting religious practice passed 
“strict scrutiny” (or the high hurdle of remedying a compelling 
governmental interest in a manner that minimizes the burden on a 
religious practice).195 After Smith, the landscape changed drastically 
and lawmakers gained great freedom to restrict religious behavior, as 
long as the statute they enacted was generally applicable to religious 
and nonreligious individuals alike.196 After Smith, generally 
 
190 Id. at 885. 
191 Id. at 883–84; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
192 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Gillette 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
193 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
194 Id. at 884–85. 
195 See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, How Jewish Laws of Resistance Can Aid Religious 
Freedom Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2012). 
196 See Kelleen Patricia Forlizzi, Note, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts as a 
Solution to the Free Exercise Problem of Religiously Based Refusals to Administer Health 
Care, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 396 (2010) (“Because this newly imposed rational basis 
standard allows great deference to the legislature at the expense of the individual’s 
constitutional right to free exercise of religion, the Smith decision was met with great 
criticism.”). 
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applicable laws only had to surmount the “rational basis” test first 
articulated in Reynolds—a law passes constitutional scrutiny as long 
as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.197 This 
state of affairs harkened back to the idea from Reynolds that 
permitting exceptions to generally applicable laws would “make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”198 
In essence, “the Supreme Court [in Smith] effectively limited first 
amendment strict scrutiny to situations in which the government 
singles out a particular religion and intentionally limits the rights of 
its members.”199 These types of intentionally discriminatory laws are 
uncommon, and the Smith test was set to govern most challenges 
accordingly. 
This narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause did not sit 
well with many in the American public. “Religious and civil liberties 
groups were shocked and angered by the Smith decision. They 
realized that it put small, unpopular religions at risk and threatened 
even mainstream religions.”200 “Civil rights groups and public leaders 
alike denounced the Smith decision as an excessive over-regulation of 
religious activity, fearing Smith would give the government the 
unlimited authority to restrict free exercise under the guise that such 
legislation imposed a mere ‘incidental’ burden.”201 Within three years 
of the Smith decision, Congress had overruled the case via legislation, 
RFRA. 
D. The Congressional Response to Smith: The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized 
Persons Act 
As anger grew over the Smith precedent, Congress took notice and 
debated a strong response. The checks and balances instituted under 
the American constitutional system allow Congress to check the 
 
197 The Smith Decision: The Court Returns to the Belief-Action Distinction, PEW 
RESEARCH (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance6/.  
198 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
199 Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State 
of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (1991). 
200 Barbara Beckwith, Reviving the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ST. ANTHONY 
MESSENGER, http://www.americancatholic.org/messenger/feb1998/feature1.asp (last 
visited July 24, 2014). 
201 Forlizzi, supra note 196, at 396. 
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Supreme Court’s power by passing legislation overturning (so to 
speak) a Court ruling. As long as Congress stays within its powers as 
enumerated in Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution when 
passing such legislation, the Supreme Court is bound to uphold it. The 
Smith case strengthened the power of the government to pass 
generally applicable legislation burdening religion. Laws overturning 
or weakening Smith, therefore, would take away federal governmental 
power, which is an action that needs no Constitutional blessing.202 
For example, legislatively created religious exceptions to laws passed 
under Congress’ taxing power reduce Congress’ taxing power.203 
Similarly, legislatively created religious exceptions to laws passed 
under the commerce power un-exercise Congress’ commerce 
power.204 In essence, Congress weakened the government’s hand 
through RFRA and such action is constitutionally appropriate. 
Smith was decided on April 17, 1990, and by July 26, 1990, the 
first bill to overturn the Smith holding and restore strict scrutiny to 
religious freedom cases was introduced in Congress.205 
Representative Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York, drafted 
the initial bill called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 
that read in pertinent part: 
(b) LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY.—A governmental authority 
may restrict any person’s free exercise of religion only if— 
(1) the restriction— 
 (A) is in the form of a rule of general applicability; and 
 (B) does not intentionally discriminate against religion, or 
 among religions; and 
(2) the governmental authority demonstrates that application of the 
restriction to the person— 
 (A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; 
 and 
 
202 See Michael Dorf, Symposium: Why is RFRA Still Valid Against the Federal 
Government?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 20, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2014/02/symposium-why-is-rfra-still-valid-against-the-federal-government/. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl103-141/bill-hr5377-19 
90.pdf. 
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 (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
 governmental interest.206 
This language would have legislatively reinstated the Sherbert test 
with an added requirement that any law burdening religion be the 
“least restrictive” way of furthering the interest. This addition—
which, as mentioned above, was not an element of the holdings in 
Sherbert or Yoder—only increased the scrutiny on legislation, 
including laws with an indirect burden on religion. This bill would 
have forced the government to prove that it considered many 
alternatives and deliberately chose the one that least burdened 
religion. For example, this least restrictive test would have required 
the government to come up with an alterative to banning polygamy in 
Reynolds or an alternative to the Sunday closing law in Braunfeld. 
Notice also that this legislation would not have required the law to 
create even a “substantial burden” on religious exercise; a mere 
restriction on religious exercise would suffice to evaluate under strict 
scrutiny. The House of Representatives held subcommittee hearings 
on this legislation but it went no further.207 
Three years later, an extraordinarily similar bill was sponsored in 
the Senate by Senator Ted Kennedy, a Democrat from 
Massachusetts,208 and in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York.209 The 
bill, called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the 
enacted RFRA), passed through Congress with near unanimous 
bipartisan approval; the bill passed the House via voice vote without 
objection and it passed the Senate with a vote of 97-3.210 This meant 
that the overall congressional vote, if taken officially in the House, 
would have been 562-3. Accordingly, RFRA passed with nearly a 
 
206 Id.; see also Douglas Martin, Stephen Solarz, Globe-Trotting Congressman, Dies at 
70, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/nyregion/30solarz 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
207 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONG.: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin 
/bdquery/?&Db=d101&querybd=@FIELD%28FLD003+@4%28%28@1%28Rep+Solarz
++Stephen+J.%29%29+01087%29%29 (last visited July 24, 2014). 
208 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993) (enacted), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl103-141/bill-s578is-19 
93.pdf. 
209 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993) 
(enacted), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl103-141/bill   
-hr1308ih-1993.pdf. 
210 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 1993, at A18. 
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99.5% approval rate. President Bill Clinton signed RFRA211 in the 
White House Rose Garden on November 16, 1993.212 At the signing 
ceremony President Clinton joked, “The power of God is such that 
even in the legislative process miracles can happen.”213 The 
congressional findings attached to RFRA were telling as to Congress’ 
intent: 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise 
of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in 
the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious 
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with 
religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious 
exercise without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, . . . the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government 
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal 
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests. 
 The purposes of this chapter are— 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
 Sherbert v. Verner, . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder, . . . and to 
 guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
 religion is substantially burdened; and 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
 exercise is substantially burdened by government.214 
Congressional finding number one harkens back to Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s thoughts that religious freedom is an unalienable right as 
discussed in Part II.A.2. Findings two through five and the first 
purpose statement unveil Congress’ intent to legislatively reinstate the 
Free Exercise Clause precedent prior to Smith (most specifically the 
precedent gleaned from Sherbert and Yoder) with some added 
 
211 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 
1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)). 
212 Steinfels, supra note 210. 
213 Id. 
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)–(b). 
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protections that the federal courts had grafted into the compelling 
interest (or strict scrutiny) test since Sherbert and Yoder. Though not 
expressly stated, Congress was specifically referring to the “least 
restrictive means” prong of the compelling interest test, where the 
government must prove that it evaluated alternative ways to advance 
its compelling interest and choose the option that least burdened 
religion. The operative statutory text of RFRA reads: 
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person— 
 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
 interest; and 
 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
 compelling governmental interest. 
(c) Judicial relief. A person whose religious exercise has been 
burdened in violation of this section may assert that 
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and 
obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to 
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be 
governed by the general rules of standing under Article III 
of the Constitution.215 
RFRA states that the government may not burden a “person’s 
exercise of religion.”216 This phrasing became tremendously important 
in the Hobby Lobby case; because RFRA does not define these terms, 
the federal Dictionary Act comes into play.217 The Dictionary Act 
defines terms that are undefined in the federal code and, in this case, 
states that the word “person”—unless the context of the particular 
statute “indicates otherwise . . . include[s] corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, 
as well as individuals.”218 The controversy in the Hobby Lobby case 
was over how, if at all, the phrase “person’s exercise of religion” in 
RFRA alters the context of the word “person” as defined in the 
 
215 Id. § 2000bb-1(a)–(c). 
216 Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
217 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (providing definitions for statutory terms and phrases). 
218 Id. 
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Dictionary Act. Debate over this issue played a major role in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, which will be discussed in depth in Part III. 
It is important to note that RFRA no longer applies to state laws 
that burden religion. Congress enacted the law to cover both state and 
federal governments as shown in the following language: 
“Government [not only Congress] shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion.”219 However, the Supreme Court held 
that Congress exceeded its power to regulate the state side of the 
equation in City of Boerne v. Flores.220 RFRA continues to apply to 
federal governmental actions including the contraceptive mandate 
issued within the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
One further federal statute merits brief mention. The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)221 
protects the religious exercise of inmates as well as “individuals, 
houses of worship, and other religious institutions from 
discrimination in zoning and landmarking laws.”222 Most relevant for 
the purposes of this Article, RFRA was amended in 2000 to adopt the 
definition of religion from RLUIPA.223 Before the amendment, 
RFRA defined the “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion 
under the First Amendment.”224 RFRA now states “that the term 
‘exercise of religion’ means religious exercise, as defined in 
[RLUIPA].”225 RLUIPA’s definition of religion is very broad and 
protective of freedom of conscience. The Supreme Court described 
the RLUIPA definition as follows: 
 
219 RFRA, § 3(a), 107 Stat. at 1488. 
220 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court in Flores held that while 
[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what 
 legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and 
 its conclusions are entitled to much deference. . . . Congress’ discretion is not 
 unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury 
 v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the 
 Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of 
 the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to 
 maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. 
Id. at 536 (citation omitted). 
221 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-4 (2012). See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 
(2005), for more general information on RLUIPA. 
222 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/rluipaexplain.php (last visited July 25, 2014). 
223 Scott Budzenski, Comment, Tug of War: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the 
Circuits—The Fifth Circuit’s Input on the Struggle to Define a Prisoner’s Right to 
Religious Freedom in Adkins v. Kaspar, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2006). 
224 Id. at 1345 n.75 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(4) (1993)). 
225 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012). 
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[I]n an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First 
Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First 
Amendment and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.” And Congress mandated that this 
concept “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious 
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this 
chapter and the Constitution.”226 
Combining RFRA and RLUIPA shows that Congress did much 
more than restore pre-Smith legal precedent.227 The combination 
demonstrates how dedicated Congress has been to protecting the 
freedom to exercise religion—even in the face of laws of general 
applicability. With this new landscape in mind, the final Section of 
this Part delves into the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. This is the 
final piece of the puzzle necessary to evaluate the Supreme Court’s 
Hobby Lobby decision. 
E. The Affordable Care Act and the Contraceptive Mandate 
As discussed briefly in Part I, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act228 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act,229 
which amended the ACA soon after its enactment (together, the 
ACA), are designed to provide lower cost and more robust health 
insurance to Americans, restrict insurance companies from denying 
coverage or canceling policies based on pre-existing conditions or 
coverage limits; fully cover certain preventative services; and 
strengthen Medicare and Medicaid.230 In 2012, the Supreme Court 
 
226 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014) (citing          
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A), which deleted the reference to the First Amendment, and § 2000cc-3(g), 
which declared that exercise of religion should be interpreted broadly). 
227 The Court in Hobby Lobby explained that in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court 
wrote that RFRA’s “least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-
Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify.” . . . On this understanding of 
[the Court’s] pre-Smith cases, RFRA did more than merely restore the balancing 
test used in the Sherbert line of cases; it provided even broader protection for 
religious liberty than was available under those decisions. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 
(1997)). 
228 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
229 Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
230 See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act: Secure 
Health Coverage for the Middle Class (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.white 
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upheld a substantial portion of the ACA from a constitutional 
challenge in the high profile case of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius.231 This Article deals primarily with 
the preventative services component (more specifically, the employer 
contraceptive mandate) of the ACA and how the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services implemented this component. 
1. The Contraceptive Mandate 
Part I of this Article recounted the federal government’s story of a 
country in which women pay much more for their health care than 
men—including a large discrepancy in costs for reproductive health 
services. In defending the ACA, the government argued that 
“[w]omen who are poor or have low incomes tend to underutilize 
preventive health care services even though those services can save 
lives and help avoid costly medical procedures.”232 This decreased 
use of health services also occurs in the use of contraceptives by 
women.233 Decreased contraceptive use is problematic because 
contraceptives may: (1) help women space out births (short intervals 
between births can lead to medical issues for newborns); (2) protect 
women in cases in which giving birth would be medically dangerous; 
(3) allow women to have flexibility to structure their work and home 
life; and (4) protect against certain types of cancers, menstrual 
disorders, and acne.234 The government argues that health insurance 
companies can remedy these issues by covering contraceptives, 
making treatment with this medicine less expensive and possibly free. 
To attack these high costs and create an environment in which 
more women get the wider swath of preventive services they need, the 
ACA requires that most insurers provide, “with respect to women, 
such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
 
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/28/fact-sheet-affordable-care-act-secure-health            
-coverage-middle-class. There are other benefits that these laws were designed to provide 
but that are less relevant for this Article. There are also significant negative consequences 
to the laws. See generally ObamaCare: Pros and Cons of ObamaCare, OBAMACARE 
FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-pros-and-cons.php (last visited July 26, 
2014). 
231 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
232 Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the Affordable 
Care Act Gives Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539, 540 
(2013) (citations omitted). 
233 Id. at 541 (citations omitted). 
234 45 C.F.R. §§ 147, 156 (2013). 
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Services Administration [HRSA].”235 This agency of HHS refers to 
itself as “the primary Federal agency for improving access to health 
care by strengthening the health care workforce, building healthy 
communities and achieving health equity.”236 Its “programs provide 
health care to people who are geographically isolated, economically 
or medically vulnerable.”237 
Although Congress required that insurance companies comply with 
HRSA’s comprehensive guidelines, these guidelines did not exist at 
the time the ACA was enacted. Furthermore, a legal requirement that 
HRSA issue comprehensive guidelines for tens of millions of women 
is no small undertaking. Therefore, HRSA asked the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM)—the nonprofit health arm of the National Academy 
of Sciences created to provide “unbiased and authoritative advice to 
decision makers and the public”238—to study the issue and report 
back. The IOM studied the scientific and medical evidence 
concerning women’s preventive health services and issued its findings 
on July 19, 2011, in a report titled Clinical Preventive Services for 
Women: Closing the Gaps.239 The IOM identified (and HRSA 
subsequently proposed in its comprehensive guidelines) eight 
women’s health services that insurance companies must cover in the 
new health care law240: 
1. Well-woman visits; 
2. Screening for gestational diabetes; 
3. Human papillomavirus testing; 
4. Counseling for sexually transmitted infections; 
 
235 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
236 About HRSA, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index 
.html (last visited July 26, 2014). 
237 Id. 
238 About the IOM, INST. OF MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited 
July 26, 2014). 
239 INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 
(July 19, 2011). The IOM charges to download the report and requires an account at the 
National Academy Press to download a free PDF version; however, the IOM provides a 
four-page summary of the report—including an outline of the eight proposed preventive 
services it desires for HHS to adopt—for free online. Report Brief: Clinical Preventive 
Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INST. OF MED., http://www.iom.edu/~/media 
/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps 
/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf (last updated Sept. 4, 2014) 
[hereinafter Report Brief]. 
240 Report Brief, supra note 239. 
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5. Counseling and screening for human immune-deficiency virus; 
6. Contraceptive methods and counseling; 
7. Breastfeeding support, supplies, and counseling; and 
8. Screening and counseling for interpersonal and domestic 
violence.241 
The Hobby Lobby case revolves around the sixth IOM/HRSA 
proposal: contraceptive methods and counseling. Additionally, the 
HRSA guidelines state that insurance companies should provide all 
prescribed “Food and Drug Administration [FDA] approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education 
and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity” at no 
cost.242 The FDA has approved twenty different forms of 
contraception, all of which most insurance plans must offer at no cost 
to patients.243 In August 2011, HHS “issued an interim final rule 
requiring insurance plans to cover contraceptives approved by the 
[FDA] as part of [the contraceptive] mandate.”244 
The federal regulations implementing this part of the ACA read as 
follows: 
These final regulations promote two important policy goals. First, 
the regulations provide women with access to contraceptive 
coverage without cost sharing, thereby advancing the compelling 
government interests in safeguarding public health and ensuring that 
women have equal access to health care. Second, the regulations 
advance these interests in a narrowly tailored fashion that protects 
certain nonprofit religious organizations with religious objections to 
providing contraceptive coverage from having to contract, arrange, 
pay, or refer for such coverage.245 
* * * 
The regulations do not violate the Free Exercise Clause because 
they are neutral and generally applicable. The regulations do not 
 
241 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/womens 
guidelines/ (last visited July 26, 2014). 
242 Id. 
243 Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, FDA, www.fda.gov/forconsumers 
/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Mar. 2013). 
244 Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 306 (2014) (citing Group Health Plans and Health 
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621-01 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)). 
245 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 147, 156, at 39,872, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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target religiously motivated conduct, but rather, are intended to 
improve women’s access to preventive health care and lessen the 
disparity between men’s and women’s health care costs. And the 
regulations are generally applicable because they do not pursue their 
purpose only against conduct motivated by religious belief. The 
exemption and accommodations set forth in the regulations serve to 
accommodate religion, not to disfavor it.246 
These comments make it obvious that the final rules are written to 
hold up against a legal challenge claiming a violation of the free 
exercise of religion. Notice the language in the rules referring to the 
government’s “compelling interest” in safe, public health care and 
equal rights to such health care for women. The inclusion of this 
language is a clear attempt to meet the “compelling governmental 
interest” prong of RFRA. Notice next the statement that these rules 
are “narrowly tailored” in order to alleviate the burden on religious 
exercise. This statement is akin to declaring that the rules are the least 
restrictive way the government could have met its compelling interest 
and designed to meet the final prong of RFRA. 
The language concerning the Free Exercise Clause in the second 
paragraph, however, is inserted in case the Court refuses to analyze 
the mandate under RFRA. If the Court does not hold that for-profit 
corporations are covered in RFRA’s definition of person, the Court 
may pursue another method of analysis under the Free Exercise 
Clause. The rules imply that they are constitutionally sound because 
they are “neutral and generally applicable” and do not target religious 
conduct. However, RFRA states that the government “shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability” and the congressional 
findings state that RFRA was designed specifically to evaluate 
generally applicable laws under strict scrutiny.247 However, cases 
analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause only (because RFRA is not 
applicable) are still governed by Smith. 
The final Section of this Part deals with the exemptions from and 
exceptions to the contraceptive mandate for religious groups and 
other types of employers and insurance plans. 
 
246 Id. at 39,888 (emphasis added). 
247 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
304 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 259 
2. Accommodations to the Contraceptive Mandate 
There are four primary accommodations to the ACA’s 
contraceptive mandate. The first two accommodations are considered 
exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. If employers qualify, 
they are not required to provide cost-free contraceptives to their 
employees. The third accommodation is classified in this Article as an 
exemption because of the lengthy debate in the Hobby Lobby oral 
arguments and briefs over its classification. The fourth 
accommodation is a workaround whereby the mandate still applies, 
but an unrelated entity (the employer’s insurance company) pays for 
employees’ contraceptives. Two accommodations are meant 
specifically for employers and organizations with religious missions, 
while the other two deal with special types of employers and 
insurance plans. This Section covers each accommodation in turn. 
First, the Religious Employer Exemption places traditional 
religious organizations outside of the contraceptive mandate. “Early 
in the rulemaking process, the [Obama] Administration exempted 
core religious institutions, like churches, synagogues, and mosques, 
from having to comply with the mandate’s requirement that 
employers provide employees with insurance coverage for 
contraceptive care.”248 To whittle down the number of employers 
eligible for this exemption, HRSA proposed that a qualifying 
organization under the Religious Employer Exemption was one that: 
1. Has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; 
2. Primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; 
3. Primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and 
4. Is a nonprofit organization described in [other sections of the 
federal code that deal with churches and their related 
entities].249 
More than 200,000 complaints and comments were filed arguing 
that this definition was too narrow, and that deep-rooted and full-
 
248 Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible 
Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1–2 (2014), available at http://columbialaw 
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Garfield-114-Columbia-Law-Review-Sidebar-1 
.pdf. 
249 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8726 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
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fledged religious groups were excluded.250 These complaints caused 
HHS to alter and simplify the qualifications. The first three prongs of 
the definition were eliminated and the fourth prong was simplified.251 
Currently, according to the final rules, a “religious employer” is an 
“organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and 
is referred to [in sections of the United States Code dealing with 
churches, other houses of worship, the integrated auxiliaries of 
churches and conventions or associations of churches, as well as the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order].”252 This 
definition still did not satisfy all religious groups and led to the 
second accommodation to be discussed next. 
As mentioned above, after the creation of the Religious Employer 
Exemption and its subsequent amendment, unexempted religious 
nonprofit organizations filed a flurry of complaints. For example: 
[R]eligiously affiliated [nonprofits] that were not covered by the 
exemption, such as universities, hospitals, social service providers, 
and insurance companies, characterized the rule as an affront to 
religious liberty. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops insisted 
that the rule drew “a new distinction—alien to both [the] Catholic 
tradition and to federal law—between our houses of worship and 
our great ministries of service to our neighbors, namely, the poor, 
the homeless, the sick, the students in our schools and universities 
and others in need, of any faith community or none.”253 
In response, the Obama administration issued a one-year safe 
harbor for religiously affiliated non-profits as it debated an additional 
accommodation.254 
 
250 See, e.g., Complaint at 17, Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 2014 WL 2826336 (N.D. Ill. 
June 23, 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-08910). 
251 Religious Exemptions to Contraceptive Coverage, UNITED HEALTHCARE, 
http://www.uhc.com/united_for_reform_resource_center/health_reform_provisions/preven
tive_services/religious_exemptions_to_contraceptive_coverage.htm (last visited July 28, 
2014). 
252 Exemption and Accommodations in Connection with Coverage of Preventive Health 
Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,896 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a)). 
253 Sepper, supra note 244, at 307 (citations omitted). 
254 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Services and 
Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press   
-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions 
(“The President will also announce that his Administration will propose and finalize a new 
regulation during this transition year to address the religious objections of the non-
exempted non-profit religious organizations. The new regulation will require insurance 
companies to cover contraception if the religious organization chooses not to.”). 
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The new accommodation that the Obama administration created, 
which refers to the groups that the accommodation covers as “Eligible 
Organizations,” is not an exemption from the contraceptive 
mandate.255 Consequently, if an employer is subject to the ACA but 
falls under this accommodation, that employer must still provide its 
employees with contraceptives at no cost.256 However, eligible 
organizations (mostly religious non-profit organizations prior to the 
Hobby Lobby decision) “will not have to contract, arrange, pay for or 
refer contraceptive coverage to which they object on religious 
grounds, but such coverage is separately provided to women enrolled 
in their health plans at no cost.”257 The basic idea is that insurance 
companies, upon receiving a request from an employer they cover, 
must pay for contraceptives out of their own pocket and use money 
that in no way comes from the objecting organization. The argument 
is that these contraceptive payments will save insurance companies 
money in the long run as employees using contraceptives will make 
fewer pregnancy-related insurance claims. In order to qualify for this 
accommodation, a religious organization must file a form with the 
government and meet the following criteria: 
1. The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of 
any contraceptive services . . . on account of religious 
objections. 
2. The organization is organized and operates as a non-profit entity 
[which will surely be amended to include for-profit, closely held 
corporations after Hobby Lobby]. 
3. The organization holds itself out as a religious organization 
[which will be amended and might even be redacted after Hobby 
Lobby]. 
4. The organization self-certifies, in a form and manner specified 
by the Secretary, that it satisfies the criteria [which might be 
eliminated after courts decide challenges under RFRA to having 
to file any form regarding contested contraceptives].258 
As mentioned above, it is important to note that this workaround 
applied only to religious non-profit entities before the Hobby Lobby 
decision. Now that the Court allows closely held for-profit 
 
255 See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,896. 
256 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Administration Issues Final 
Rules on Contraception Coverage and Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/06/20130628a.html. 
257 Id. 
258 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b). 
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corporations to avoid the contraceptive mandate, however, HHS will 
need to revise these rules accordingly. There is a strong likelihood 
that only the first prong above will remain intact as it currently reads. 
Many religious non-profit organizations, such as schools and 
hospitals, have objected to and filed lawsuits against this 
workaround.259 These organizations argue that the mere requirement 
of filing a form to opt out of the contraceptive mandate is the 
equivalent of the employer tacitly authorizing the insurance company 
to provide drugs that induce abortions. Though these lawsuits are 
outside the scope of this Article, they constitute the next battle against 
the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and merit close analysis as they are 
adjudicated. 
The ACA also does not apply to any business with fewer than fifty 
employees in a calendar year.260 This accommodation covers more 
employees than it might appear upon first glance. For example, the 
White House issued a report finding that “96 percent of all firms in 
the United States or 5.8 million out of 6 million total firms [are 
relieved] from any employer responsibility requirements [under the 
ACA]. These 5.8 million firms employ nearly 34 million workers.”261 
It is important to note that the ACA requirements will apply if 
employers with fewer than fifty employees begin to offer health 
insurance plans. This reality led the government, in oral arguments in 
the Hobby Lobby case, to argue that an employer with fewer than fifty 
employees is not “exempt” from the contraceptive mandate at all.262 
This argument was made in part to show that the ACA is a 
comprehensive scheme in which uniform application of the 
contraceptive mandate is key to the law’s success. The plaintiffs in 
the Hobby Lobby case argued that this accommodation created a large 
 
259 HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab4 (last visited July 28, 2014) 
(collecting cases and other information regarding the ACA’s contraceptive mandate). 
260 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012) (stating the requirements for a “large employer”); id.  
§ 4980H(c)(2)(A) (defining an “applicable large employer” as “an employer who 
employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the 
preceding calendar year”); see also The Affordable Care Act Increases Choice and Saving 
Money for Small Businesses, WHITE HOUSE, at 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/files 
/documents/health_reform_for_small_businesses.pdf (last visited July 29, 2014) 
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT] (stating that businesses with fewer than fifty 
employees are exempt from employer responsibility requirements). 
261 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 260, at 1. 
262 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
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exemption that proved that the government did not have a compelling 
interest in all employees receiving cost-free contraceptives.263 For 
purposes of fairness, this Article refers to employers with fewer than 
fifty employees as receiving an accommodation. 
Finally, the ACA allows insurance companies to avoid some of its 
requirements if their insurance plans do not make any significant 
changes to plan terms after March 23, 2010—the date the ACA was 
signed into law.264 These so-called “grandfathered plans” are allowed 
to provide the coverage they did prior to the ACA.265 In addition, 
these plans are exempt from the duty to provide cost-free 
contraceptives under the contraceptive mandate (or any other 
women’s preventive health services for that matter).266 Grandfathered 
plans may remain exempt (the law provides no expiration date) and 
will not lose grandfathered status even if, for example, employees 
leave the plan, employees are added to the plan, employers change 
insurance providers, or insurance premiums rise within the acceptable 
range of medical inflation.267 A plan will lose its grandfathered status 
if, for example, it eliminates substantially all benefits to diagnose or 
treat a medical condition (such as diabetes or HIV/AIDS), decreases 
the employer’s contribution to the plan by more than five percent, or 
lowers the annual insurance coverage limit.268 
Hobby Lobby did not fit within any of these four accommodations. 
It was not a religious employer such as a church, synagogue or 
mosque that qualified for the Religious Employer Exemption. It was 
not a religious non-profit entity that qualified for the workaround. The 
 
263 Reply Brief for Respondent at 6, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (Feb. 10, 2014) (No. 13-354), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp           
-content/uploads/2014/02/13-354-bs-1-copy.pdf (“[S]mall businesses with fewer than fifty 
employees—96% of all firms in the United States—are exempt from the ACA requirement 
that employers provide health insurance to their employees.”); see also id. at 15 (“[T]he 
government has already granted a bevy of exceptions to the  mandate, for reasons ranging 
from religious accommodation to administrative convenience. Having granted multiple 
exemptions for multiple reasons, the government cannot validly fall back on a compelling 
interest in comprehensiveness.”). 
264 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2) (2012). 
265 What Does Having Grandfathered Status Mean?, MED. MUTUAL, https://www 
.medmutual.com/Healthcare-Reform/The-Basics/Grandfathered-Status.aspx (last visited 
July 28, 2014). 
266 See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (“Being a grandfathered health plan 
means that your [plan or policy] may not include certain consumer protections of the 
Affordable Care Act that apply to other plans, for example, the requirement for the 
provision of preventive health services without any cost sharing.”). 
267 42 C.F.R. § 147.140(a)-(b), (g) (2011). 
268 Id. § 147.140(g). 
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company employed more than 13,000 people, so it was ineligible for 
the fewer-than-50 employees accommodation.269 Finally, Hobby 
Lobby’s insurance plan changed after the ACA was enacted, meaning 
it had lost its grandfathered status.270 To avoid providing the 
controversial contraceptives without facing staggering fines, paying 
an expensive tax, or dropping its health plan entirely, the company 
needed HHS to amend these accommodations or win the legal battle 
over its free exercise claims. The legal battle forms the substance of 
Part III of this Article. 
III 
THE HOBBY LOBBY CASE IN COURT 
Hobby Lobby, along with five members of the Green family, sued 
the federal government on September 12, 2012.271 The plaintiffs’ 
target was the contraceptive mandate and its requirement that they 
violate their sincere religious beliefs and provide four types of 
contraceptives (Plan B, Ella, and two intrauterine devices) that they 
believed induced abortions.272 The company faced the ACA’s 
upcoming deadline of July 1, 2013, to include all twenty FDA-
approved contraceptives in its health care package. Hobby Lobby had 
ten months to obtain a court-ordered injunction to stop the mandate’s 
application to its policy, until the litigation was resolved. 
At the crux of the lawsuit was Hobby Lobby’s belief that the 
government provided the company with three unacceptable choices: 
(1) comply with the mandate, offer all twenty FDA-approved 
contraceptives, and violate the owners’ religious beliefs, as well as the 
religiously-oriented company values in honoring the Lord and 
nurturing families; (2) ignore the mandate, exclude the four 
contraceptives at issue from its insurance policy and face 
extraordinarily large noncompliance penalties of $100 a day per 
affected employee (totaling around $475 million per year);273 or (3) 
drop the company’s health insurance plan altogether, and pay the tax 
 
269 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014). 
270 Id. at 2766. 
271 Hobby Lobby Complaint, supra note 16, at 40. 
272 Id. at 23. 
273 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (2012) (describing the penalty for non-compliance with 
the mandate). Hobby Lobby employed around 13,000 people at the time of this decision. 
The total penalty for non-compliance would be around $475 million (13,000 employees x 
$100 penalty per day x 365 days per year = $474,500,000.00). 
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for failing to abide by the ACA’s mandate that large employers offer 
ACA compliant health insurance (assessed monthly and totaling 
around $26 million per year).274 
With the looming deadline less than a year away, the company 
asked a federal district court in Oklahoma for a preliminary 
injunction. The company’s hope was threefold: (1) the district court 
would issue the injunction before the deadline, (2) Hobby Lobby 
would win the jury trial or the decisive appeal if the jury verdict or 
one of the judge’s decisions came back unfavorably, and (3) these 
outcomes would combine to allow Hobby Lobby to avoid making one 
of these three unacceptable choices. The next Sections evaluate the 
case each step of the way, from the filing of the complaint in 2012, 
through the Supreme Court’s decision on June 30, 2014. It is 
interesting to evaluate how each judge and court weighed the private 
interests in religious freedom that RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, 
and pre-Smith precedent protected against the government’s interest 
in improving women’s health through the contraceptive mandate. 
A. The District Court Opinion 
Hobby Lobby is based in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and this 
location likely explains why the plaintiffs sued in Oklahoma.275 The 
lawsuit requested a jury trial and the following: (1) a declaration that 
the contraceptive mandate and its enforcement against the plaintiffs 
violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, (2) a 
declaration that HHS’ enforcement of the mandate against the 
plaintiffs violates RFRA, (3) a declaration that the mandate violates 
the Administrative Procedure Act (which allows courts to stop agency 
action that is unlawful),276 (4) a permanent injunction barring the 
 
274 Id. § 4980H(a), (c)(1) (describing the approximately $2,000 per year tax owed for 
not providing the insurance required of “large employers” under the ACA).  Since Hobby 
Lobby employed around 13,000 people at the time of this decision, the total penalty for 
non-compliance under this option would be around $26 million ($2,000 x 13,000 
employees = $26,000,000.00). 
275 Hobby Lobby Website, supra note 12 (“Hobby Lobby Stores [is based] in 
Oklahoma City, OK . . . .”). 
276 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (allowing an appellate court to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be [among other things] . . . (A) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity . . . (C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”). Hobby Lobby 
argued that the mandate violated the ACA, which states that no qualified health plan will 
be forced to provide abortions as part of its essential health benefits. See Hobby Lobby 
Complaint, supra note 16, at 38. The government responded to that accusation by stating 
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enforcement of the mandate against the plaintiffs as well as other 
organizations that object to the mandate on religious grounds, (5) 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and (6) further relief that the 
court may award if it is deemed “equitable and just.”277 The part of 
the plaintiffs’ complaint that alleges a violation of RFRA tracks each 
prong of the statute and alleges, among other things, that: 
1. The Greens have a sincere religious belief that they may not take 
part in any activity that would cause an abortion which includes 
providing coverage or access to abortion-inducing drugs;278 
2. The four contraceptives at issue in the case may induce abortions 
and, therefore, the plaintiffs’ sincere belief forces them to 
remove such contraceptives from their health insurance plan. 
However, such removal places a substantial burden on the 
company to choose between the religious beliefs of its founders 
and following the law and its substantial fines for 
[noncompliance].279 
3. The mandate serves no compelling governmental interest and is 
not narrowly tailored or the least restrictive way the government 
can achieve its stated interests.280 
The part of the plaintiffs’ complaint that alleges a violation of the 
First Amendment contained both a free exercise and a free speech 
component. The free exercise part of the complaint makes the same 
allegations as the RFRA part of the complaint but adds that the 
mandate is not a generally applicable law because of its four large 
accommodations. The plaintiffs argued that the fact that so many 
people are left out of the mandate’s reach indicates that the law was 
written to target religious exercise. Therefore, the Free Exercise 
Clause requires, under Smith, that the government have a compelling 
interest to justify its mandate and such an interest does not exist.281 
The plaintiffs’ free speech violations are also interesting. Hobby 
Lobby alleged that the mandate would require the company to provide 
education and counseling “related to abortion-causing drugs and 
 
that it does not believe the four contraceptives at issue in the case cause abortions. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 262, at 76–77 (quoting the Solicitor General as 
stating that the belief that these drugs cause abortions is “not the judgment that Federal law 
or State law reflects . . . which do preclude funding for abortions don’t consider these 
particular forms of contraception to be abortion”). 
277 Hobby Lobby Complaint, supra note 16, at 39–40. 
278 Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
279 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
280 Id. (emphasis added). 
281 Id. at 30–31. 
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devices.”282 It is this compelled speech, they argued, which is not a 
narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest and thereby 
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.283 
The federal district court in Oklahoma denied Hobby Lobby’s 
request for a preliminary injunction.284 Judge Joe Heaton ruled that 
the company had failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the 
merits of their First Amendment or RFRA claims, which is required 
to issue a preliminary injunction.285 First, Judge Heaton held that for-
profit corporations do not have free exercise rights.286 These rights 
are purely personal and, therefore, only available to natural people 
and religious corporations in which people exercise religion.287 The 
court then made the point that religious non-profit corporations are 
different because what happens at a religiously oriented non-profit 
entity is much different from what happens at a for-profit 
corporation.288 Although the Greens personally possess free exercise 
rights, the court was unsure whether these personal rights translated to 
their closely held, for-profit corporation.289 This decision was 
unnecessary, however, because the Greens were “unlikely to prevail 
as to their constitutional claims because the preventive care coverage 
regulations they challenge[d] are neutral laws of general applicability 
which are rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective.”290 Recall from Smith case generally applicable laws 
analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause merely have to pass the 
rational basis test whereby the government only has to show that the 
law is designed to further a legitimate governmental interest.291 Since 
the Greens did not make the case that the mandate was unsupported 
 
282 Id. at 34. 
283 Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the compelled counseling would violate their First 
Amendment rights to expressive association because they would be forced to cooperate 
with other groups to provide advice on abortion-inducing drugs. Id. at 35. 
284 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296–97 (W.D. Okla. 
2012). 
285 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(recounting the preliminary injunction denial). A party requesting a preliminary injunction 
must also show that, absent an injunction, the party will suffer irreparable harm that 
outweighs any harm to the other side, and that an injunction would serve the public 
interest. Id. 
286 See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287–88. 
287 Id. at 1288. 
288 Id. 
289 See id. 
290 Id. at 1296. 
291 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–85 (1990). 
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by a legitimate governmental interest, their free exercise claim 
failed.292 
The court then moved to the plaintiffs’ RFRA claims; Judge 
Heaton opined that this part of the case presented a “closer 
question.”293 This close call is because RFRA presents stronger 
protections for religious exercise than does the First Amendment.294 
Even so, the judge held that for-profit corporations are not persons 
under RFRA because corporations “do not, separate and apart from 
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, 
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or 
take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the 
intention and direction of their individual actors.”295 Similar to the 
First Amendment holding, the court stated that religious exercise “is, 
by its nature, one of those ‘purely personal’ matters . . . which is not 
the province of a general business corporation.”296 The judge then 
held that the Greens had not proved that the mandate would place a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise because the idea that the 
money that Hobby Lobby paid to insurance companies might be used 
down the road by a third party to receive an abortion was too 
attenuated to be substantial under RFRA.297 Instead, the substantial 
burden requirement of RFRA must be more “direct and personal” 
than a mandated provision of money that might be used for 
contraception.298 
B. The Tenth Circuit Panel Decision and Initial Supreme Court 
Appeal 
Hobby Lobby appealed the district court’s denial of its preliminary 
injunction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and asked for 
injunctive relief while its appeal was pending.299 A two-judge panel 
 
292 Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. at 1291. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1293–94. 
298 Id. at 1294. 
299 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26741, at *1–2 (10th 
Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). 
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of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and denied Hobby 
Lobby’s request for an injunction.300 The panel held: 
 We agree with the district court that plaintiffs failed to satisfy 
[the substantial likelihood of success] standard on the first element 
of their RFRA claim, that the challenged mandate “substantially 
burden[ed] [their] exercise of religion.” . . . Thus, like the district 
court, we need not consider whether defendants have shown that the 
mandate is “‘in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest’ 
and ‘is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.’”301 
 * * * 
 [Therefore, w]e do not think there is a substantial likelihood that 
this court will extend the reach of RFRA to encompass the 
independent conduct of third parties with whom the plaintiffs have 
only a commercial relationship.302 
Hobby Lobby’s second loss left the company with only two arrows 
in its quiver. First, the plaintiffs chose to appeal the injunction to the 
United States Supreme Court under the All Writs Act.303 The Court 
denied Hobby Lobby’s request via an order from Justice 
Sotomayor’s—an opinion she had the authority to issue on her own as 
the sitting “Circuit Justice” overseeing the Tenth Circuit.304 Justice 
Sotomayor explained that Hobby Lobby’s right to an injunction under 
RFRA was not “indisputably clear.”305 She also held that the issue 
was one of first impression and did not tip far enough in the plaintiffs’ 
favor to overcome the difficult standard of the All Writs Act: 
 This Court has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free 
exercise claims brought by closely held for-profit corporations and 
their controlling shareholders alleging that the mandatory provision 
of certain employee benefits substantially burdens their exercise of 
religion. . . . Moreover, the applicants correctly recognize that lower 
courts have diverged on whether to grant temporary injunctive relief 
to similarly situated plaintiffs raising similar claims . . . and no 
court has issued a final decision granting permanent relief with 
respect to such claims. Second, while the applicants allege they will 
 
300 Id. at *2. 
301 Id. at *8 (citations omitted). 
302 Id. at *9–10. 
303 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012). 
304 Id. at 643. The All Writs Act generally allows federal courts to issue court orders as 
a necessary and proper aid in adjudicating a case properly under the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). See generally Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. 
Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (interpreting the breadth of the All Writs Act). 
305 Hobby Lobby, 133 S. Ct. at 643 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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face irreparable harm if they are forced to choose between 
complying with the contraception-coverage requirement and paying 
significant fines, they cannot show that an injunction is necessary or 
appropriate to aid our jurisdiction. Even without an injunction 
pending appeal, the applicants may continue their challenge to the 
regulations in the lower courts. Following a final judgment, they 
may, if necessary, file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this 
Court.306 
The second arrow was a long-shot appeal to the Tenth Circuit to 
rehear the case en banc (or in front of the entire panel of circuit 
judges).307 This appeal beat the odds and was granted; the Tenth 
Circuit also agreed to expedite the case in consideration of the 
looming deadline that the mandate posed.308 
C. The Tenth Circuit En Banc Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, narrowed the case to two issues: 
(1) Hobby Lobby’s First Amendment free exercise challenge and (2) 
Hobby Lobby’s RFRA challenge. Judge Tymkovich wrote a majority 
opinion that reversed and remanded the district court opinion.309 The 
majority found that Hobby Lobby qualifies as a “person” under 
RFRA because the law did not define the term and, therefore, the 
Dictionary Act definition applied.310 The majority’s reasoning was as 
follows: 
1. The Dictionary Act includes corporations in its definition of 
“person.”311 
2. “[N]either the Dictionary Act nor RFRA explicitly distinguishes 
between for-profit and non-profit corporations . . . .”312 
3. “[T]he Dictionary Act definition [of person] does not apply if 
the context [of the statute or related statues] indicates 
otherwise;” however, the fact that other related statutes, such as 
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the National 
Labor Relations Act, provide exemptions for religious 
 
306 Id. (citations omitted). 
307 En banc review is extremely rare. Alexandra Sadinsky, Redefining En Banc Review 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2004 (2014). 
308 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2013). 
309 Id. at 1147. Judges Kelly, Hartz, Gorsuch, and Bacharach joined Judge Tymkovich 
in the majority opinion; however, Judge Bacharach did not join the majority in its holding 
on the final two prongs of the preliminary injunction standard. Id. at 1121. 
310 Id. at 1129. 
311 See id. 
312 Id. 
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employers evidences “that Congress knows how to” exclude for-
profit corporations when it desires. It did not do so in RFRA.313 
4. The relevant case law is not directly on point and does not 
discuss whether for-profit corporations may exercise religion; 
this makes it difficult to glean any insight on Congress’ view on 
the matter when enacting RFRA.314 
5. The Free Exercise Clause is not a purely personal guarantee. It 
protects non-profit corporations as well as un-incorporated 
individuals seeking a profit. It makes little sense to exclude a 
religious adherent merely because he chooses to incorporate his 
business.315 
After concluding that Hobby Lobby qualified as a person under 
RFRA, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to analyze the requirements 
necessary to prevail under the statute—a sincere religious belief, a 
substantial burden on the sincere belief, a compelling governmental 
compelling, and least restrictive alternatives. The circuit court 
delineated Hobby Lobby’s religious belief (that life begins at 
conception and must be preserved), found the belief is sincere, and 
determined that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened this 
belief.316 Furthermore, this substantial burden created a “Hobson’s 
choice” between the company violating its religious belief or face 
staggering fines.317 
The court moved to the next prong of RFRA—determining 
whether the government had a compelling interest in the 
contraceptive mandate. In its brief to the Tenth Circuit, the 
government proffered two interests it argued were compelling.318 
First, the government claimed it had a compelling interest (held as 
such by a federal court in another similar RFRA case) in 
“safeguarding the public health by regulating the health care and 
 
313 Id. at 1129–30 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
314 Id. at 1131–32. 
315 Id. at 1135–36 (“We are also troubled—as we believe Congress would be—by the 
notion that Free Exercise rights turn on Congress’s definition of ‘non-profit.’ What if 
Congress eliminates the for-profit/non-profit distinction in tax law? Do for-profit 
corporations then gain Free Exercise rights? Or do non-profits lose Free Exercise rights? 
Or what if Congress, believing that large organizations are less likely to have a true non-
profit motive, declares that non-profit entities may not have more than 1,000 employees? 
Would a church with more than 1,000 employees lose its Free Exercise rights? Or consider 
a church that, for whatever reason, loses its 501(c)(3) status. Does it thereby lose Free 
Exercise rights?”). 
316 Id. at 1140–41. 
317 Id. at 1146–47. 
318 Brief for Appellees at 34–41, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 
(10th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-6294). 
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insurance markets.”319 As stated in Part I, the idea is that the high cost 
reduces contraceptive use and increases unintended pregnancies and 
the number of abortions. Second, the government claimed it had a 
compelling interest in promoting gender equality.320 Again, as 
detailed in Part I, evidence shows that women of childbearing age 
spend sixty-eight percent more on health care costs than men.321 The 
contraceptive mandate helps equalize the playing field.322 The Tenth 
Circuit majority found that neither of these interests were compelling 
for two reasons. First, the majority held that “both interests as 
articulated by the government are insufficient under [this Court’s 
precedent] because they are ‘broadly formulated interests justifying 
the general applicability of government mandates.’ And the 
government offers almost no justification for not ‘granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants.’”323 Second, these 
interests cannot be compelling because tens of millions of people 
remain uncovered by the mandate.324 More specifically, as the 
Supreme Court has said, “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an 
interest of the highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that 
supposedly vital interest unprohibited. . . . The exemptions at issue 
here would yield precisely this result: they would leave unprotected 
all women who work for exempted business entities.”325 
Encountering the least restrictive means prong, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that the proffered governmental interests in public health 
and gender equality—even if found compelling—would not be 
undermined by granting the company a partial exemption to the 
contraceptive mandate.326 In the words of the majority, “Hobby 
Lobby . . . ask[s] only to be excused from covering four contraceptive 
methods out of twenty, not to be excused from covering contraception 
altogether. The government does not articulate why accommodating 
such a limited request fundamentally frustrates its goals.”327 These 
comments are a form of legal scolding—a statement that a party 
 
319 Id. at 35 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
320 Id. at 36. 
321 Id. at 36–37. 
322 Id. at 37. 
323 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (2013) (citations 
omitted). 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 1143–44 (citations omitted). 
326 Id. at 1144. 
327 Id. 
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should have or could have done more to make its case. In a footnote, 
the majority made this point more clearly: 
 The government suggests on appeal that a limited number of 
women can only use the four contraceptives to which Hobby Lobby 
[objects]. The government did not raise this argument below nor has 
it provided any factual support for this claim. It is free to raise this 
argument below in permanent injunction proceedings.328 
In the end, the least restrictive means prong is a very important part 
of the analysis, and the government should have made a stronger case. 
The government, in its brief to the Tenth Circuit, did touch upon the 
idea that it is a personal decision between a woman and her doctor to 
choose which type of contraceptive to use.329 But, the argument was 
not made in the brief that only a limited number of women are 
medically able to use only the four contraceptives that Hobby Lobby 
excluded. The Tenth Circuit majority was looking for more. 
The majority did not find fault in the fact that Hobby Lobby’s 
position created a burden on third parties (its employees who would 
lose a legal entitlement to four types of free contraceptives). In fact, 
unlike the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit did not venture into 
solutions to this problem. The majority merely held: 
Accommodations for religion frequently operate by lifting a burden 
from the accommodated party and placing it elsewhere. The 
government itself has even taken this step with the contraceptive-
coverage requirement by accommodating certain religious 
employers, at the expense of their employees. That is part of 
accommodating religion—and is RFRA’s basic purpose.330 
Two dissents were filed in the case.331 The first, written by Chief 
Judge Briscoe and joined by Judge Lucero, argued that Hobby Lobby 
does not qualify as a “person” under RFRA, making it impossible for 
the corporation to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of 
the case.332 More specifically, Chief Judge Briscoe wrote: 
 
328 Id. at 1144 n.19. 
329 Brief for Appellees, supra note 318, at 38. 
330 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1144–45. 
331 Both were opinions that concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 1163, 1178. 
However, the concurrence part of each opinion was on a minor legal matter in the case 
concerning the application of the Anti-Injunction Act—a statute barring lawsuits 
concerning taxes before they are collected. See id. at 1121 (“As to jurisdictional matters, 
the court unanimously holds that Hobby Lobby [has] Article III standing to sue and that 
the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to this case.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012) 
(Anti-Injunction Act). Therefore, these two opinions are best classified as dissents from 
the majority’s opinion on RFRA and its application to a for-profit corporation. 
332 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1175 (Briscoe, J., dissenting in part). 
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 In its eagerness to afford rights under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to Hobby Lobby . . . the majority ignores the 
fundamental components upon which sound judicial 
decisionmaking is grounded: evidence, of which plaintiffs presented 
none; burdens of persuasion, which indisputably rest on the 
plaintiffs but which the majority effectively imposes on the 
defendants; and precedent, of which there is none to support the 
plaintiffs’ novel claims under RFRA, or the new class of 
corporations effectively recognized by the majority. I therefore 
dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Hobby Lobby . . . [has] 
established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of [its] 
RFRA claims, and the majority’s concomitant decision to reverse 
the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief.333 
Judge Matheson penned a partial dissent whereby he would: (1) 
affirm the district court’s preliminary injunction denial (Hobby 
Lobby’s RFRA claim), (2) grant the Greens standing for asserting 
claims under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, “(3) reverse the 
district court’s holding that the Greens’ RFRA claim is not 
substantially likely to succeed and remand for reconsideration[,] and 
(4) affirm the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction on the 
plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claim.”334 Judge Matheson did not 
believe that Hobby Lobby had produced enough persuasive evidence 
proving that RFRA applied to for-profit corporations.335 More 
specifically, he argued that corporations and their shareholders are 
generally seen as distinct legal entities under the law, and that Hobby 
Lobby had not provided enough evidence that this corporate veil 
should be pierced to allow Hobby Lobby to assume the Green’s 
religious beliefs.336 Judge Matheson would hold, however, that the 
Greens personally have a much better case alleging a violation of 
RFRA.337 This argument held sway with only four judges on the 
panel, therefore, it was not part of the majority opinion. 
In the end, a five-judge majority of the Tenth Circuit sitting en 
banc held that the district court had erred in holding that Hobby 
Lobby had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on its RFRA 
claim.338 Three judges disagreed with that assessment and would 
 
333 Id. at 1163. 
334 Id. at 1191 (Matheson, J., dissenting in part). 
335 Id. at 1181–83. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 1184. 
338 Id. at 1121–22. 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
320 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 259 
have affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary 
injunction.339 The same five-judge majority held that Hobby Lobby 
met the irreparable harm component of the preliminary injunction 
standard.340 Four of the five would have ruled for Hobby Lobby on 
the other two components of the standard and granted the 
injunction.341 However, four judges did not constitute a majority of 
the eight-judge en banc panel. Therefore, the case was remanded to 
the federal district court in Oklahoma to “address the remaining two 
preliminary injunction factors and then assess whether to grant or 
deny the plaintiffs’ motion.”342 
D. The District Court Decision on Remand 
On remand and advised by the Tenth Circuit, the district court 
issued the preliminary injunction.343 Judge Heaton determined that 
the balance of harms tilts more toward Hobby Lobby: 
 [T]he government’s interest in providing [Hobby Lobby’s] 
13,000 employees with access to all FDA-approved contraceptive 
methods, through their employment-based group health plans, is not 
insignificant. However, the bulk of the approved methods are 
available to them, unlike a substantial number of other employees 
whose plans the government has completely exempted from the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement of the ACA. If the injunction 
does not issue, Hobby Lobby . . . must either face penalties that 
could conceivably amount to $1.3 million/day or the violation of 
their newly recognized religious rights, as for-profit corporations, 
under RFRA. On balance, the court finds the threatened injury to 
the corporations if the injunction does not issue outweighs the 
potential harm to the government.344 
The district court also ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby on the third 
prong of the preliminary injunction test—the party requesting the 
injunction must show that an injunction would not be “adverse to the 
public interest.”345 Though Judge Heaton found this issue to be a 
closer call, he ruled that the public has an interest in preserving the 
status quo while the “new and substantial questions of law and public 
 
339 Id. at 1121. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 1122. 
343 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-12-1000-HE, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107248, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013). 
344 Id. at *3–4. 
345 Id. at *4. 
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policy” that the contraceptive mandate raised are sorted out legally.346 
This neccessity is especially true since the corporation would face 
substantial penalties for non-compliance.347 Hobby Lobby had its 
injunction, but the company was in fact waiting for the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari and hear its case. 
E. Hobby Lobby at the Supreme Court 
The injunction was issued on July 19, 2013, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari four months later on November 26, 2013.348 The 
case was consolidated with a case called Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corporation v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (involving a very similar legal challenge but in 
which the Third Circuit ruled for the government)349 and an oral 
argument schedule was allocated. The Court heard oral argument on 
March 25, 2014, and issued its decision on June 30, 2014, the last day 
of its October 2013 term.350 
The Hobby Lobby case was the highlight of the Supreme Court’s 
term. Just before the decision, an MSNBC article captured the 
moment like this: “Monday’s the day. That’s when the suspense of 
the most-watched Supreme Court case this term is expected to 
abate.”351 The article was titled Every Way the Supreme Court Could 
Rule in Hobby Lobby, which was impressive because the popular 
press seldom dissects the Court’s cases in this exhaustive of a manner. 
1. The Majority Opinion 
In a controversial352 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of Hobby Lobby.353 Justice Alito authored the majority opinion and 
 
346 Id. at *4–5. 
347 Id. at *4. 
348 Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (mem.). 
349 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). For sake of brevity, the Conestoga Wood case will not 
be discussed in this analysis because it raised the same legal issues that can be dealt with 
adequately via an analysis of the Hobby Lobby case. 
350 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com 
/case-files/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
351 Irin Carmon, Every Way the Supreme Court Could Rule in Hobby Lobby, MSNBC 
(June 28, 2014, 3:41 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/every-way-the-supreme-court    
-could-rule-hobby-lobby. 
352 See, e.g., Ed Silverstein, Hobby Lobby Decision Creates Controversy About 
Contraception, Obamacare, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 1, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel 
.com/2014/07/01/hobby-lobby-decision-creates-controversy-about-con (“The Burwell vs. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. case, which was narrowly decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
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was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas.354 Justice Ginsburg filed the primary dissent, in which 
Justice Sotomayor joined in full, and Justices Breyer and Kagan 
joined in part.355 Justices Breyer and Kagan also filed a very short 
joint dissent.356 
In some cases, the Supreme Court does not tip its hand as to its 
ruling until the reader is deeply into an opinion. For example, the 
Court masked its holding in the constitutional challenge to the ACA 
itself until the Court upheld the ACA as a tax many pages into the 
opinion.357 In Hobby Lobby, however, Justice Alito issued a strong 
statement that revealed the Court’s decision in the first few 
paragraphs: 
 We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate 
RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any 
action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that 
action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling 
government interest. 
 In holding that the HHS mandate is unlawful, we reject HHS’s 
argument that the owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA 
protection when they decided to organize their businesses as 
corporations rather than sole proprietorships or general partnerships. 
The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did 
not discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to 
run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner 
required by their religious beliefs.358 
 
has led to a lot of controversy. Those who support conservative religious values champion 
the recently released decision, but pro-choice advocates were critical of the 5-4 ruling.”); 
Mark Blumenthal & Ariel Edwards-Levy, HUFFPOLLSTER: Views of Supreme Court 
Shift After Hobby Lobby Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/10/supreme-court-hobby-lobby_n_5575723.html (“Although 
the Hobby Lobby decision was unpopular with Democrats, whose image of the Court 
shifted from mixed to negative after the ruling, Republicans (who were more positive 
about the Court to begin with) became even more positive. Favorable ratings of the 
Supreme Court jumped six points among Republicans, while unfavorable views rose seven 
points among Democrats. But the greatest change in perception of the Supreme Court 
came from independents. Last week, independents were more unfavorable than favorable, 
this week, a majority of independents are favorable.” (citation omitted)). 
353 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
354 Id. at 2758. 
355 Id. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined all but Part III-C-I of Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent. Id. 
356 Id. 
357 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012). 
358 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
2014] Religious Freedom and Closely Held Corporations: The  323 
Hobby Lobby Case and Its Ethical Implications 
The remainder of Justice Alito’s opinion was structured into five 
parts and is best organized part-by-part in table form. 
TABLE 1. The Hobby Lobby Decision: Part-by-Part 
PART ANALYSIS 
I(A) 
RFRA 
The majority opinion began by introducing RFRA and 
reiterating its broad protection of religious liberty and 
its legislative reversal of Smith.359 Justice Alito also 
reiterated that RLUIPA altered the definition of religion 
in RFRA “in an obvious effort to effect a complete 
separation from First Amendment case law” and in 
order to define the “exercise of religion” to include 
“‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, 
or central to, a system of religious belief.’”360 The 
majority opinion painted RFRA, appropriately, with the 
broad brush that Congress intended. 
I(B) 
THE 
CONTRACEPTIVE 
MANDATE 
The opinion then introduced the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate, its requirements, and its history.361 Justice 
Alito took care to point out each of the mandate’s four 
major exemptions/accommodations and stated that the 
mandate “presently does not apply to tens of millions of 
people.”362 This type of argument is generally meant to 
indicate that the mandate is not part of a comprehensive 
legal scheme. The takeaway from Parts I(A)–(B) is that 
RFRA is a broad and comprehensive protection for 
religious exercise and the mandate is important but not 
as broad or comprehensive. 
II(A) & (B) 
LITIGANT 
BACKGROUND 
STORIES 
Justice Alito then began to tell, albeit briefly, the story 
of the plaintiffs in the Conestoga Wood case and the 
Hobby Lobby case respectively.363 As discussed in Part 
I, this type of storytelling is a rare but important treat in 
a judicial opinion. These two sections end with a very 
brief sketch of the procedural history of both cases.364 
 
359 Id. at 2760–61. 
360 Id. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012)). 
361 Id. at 2762–63. 
362 Id. at 2764. 
363 Id. at 2764–66. 
364 Id. at 2764–67. 
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PART ANALYSIS 
III(A) 
FOR-PROFIT 
CORPORATIONS 
& RFRA 
Part III moved to the meat of the case and began to 
evaluate whether for-profit corporations may make legal 
claims under RFRA. The Court stated that RFRA was 
designed to extend “far beyond what this Court has held 
is constitutionally required.”365 This statement indicates 
the majority’s belief that Congress intended to extend 
protection to individuals, to non-profit corporations, and 
to people who incorporate in order to make a profit. 
Otherwise, small business owners in particular would be 
put to the unfair choice: “[E]ither give up the right to 
seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo 
the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating 
as corporations.”366 
The majority claimed that corporations are merely a 
legal fiction created to provide protection to people.367 
In that vein, “protecting the free-exercise rights of 
corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects the 
religious liberty of the humans who own and control 
those companies.”368 In an important line from the case, 
Justice Alito concluded that “[c]orporations, ‘separate 
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and 
are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”369 
This was the part of the case that everyone was 
anticipating. How would the Justices justify, if at all, a 
for-profit corporation’s right to exercise religion? The 
answer was that corporations are mere shells with the 
primary purpose of protecting people, and this includes 
protecting people’s religious exercise. 
III(B)(1) 
CORPORATIONS 
ARE PERSONS 
UNDER RFRA 
The majority then spent time further proving that the 
term “person” in RFRA applied to corporations. The 
Court referred to the Dictionary Act definition of 
“person” as required by law and found that “[w]e see 
nothing in RFRA that suggests a congressional intent to 
depart from the Dictionary Act definition, and HHS 
makes little effort to argue otherwise.”370 In other 
words, the context of RFRA did not “indicate 
otherwise” in terms of defining person to exclude for-
profit corporations. 
Justice Alito also found strength in the fact that the 
Court had entertained RFRA cases by non-profit 
 
365 Id. at 2767. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 2768. 
368 Id. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. at 2768. 
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corporations in the past and in HHS’ concession that 
non-profit corporations are “persons” under RFRA.371 
He added, “[n]o known understanding of the term 
‘person’ includes some but not all corporations.”372 The 
government’s case would have been stronger if the 
corporate form across the board was found not to 
qualify for protection under RFRA. But, Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the free exercise of religion has 
taken a different approach. 
III(B)(2) 
CORPORATIONS 
EXERCISE 
RELIGION UNDER 
RFRA 
Part III(B)(2) attacked the notion that corporations 
cannot “exercise religion” as RFRA requires. The 
majority reiterated that, as it proved earlier in Part 
III(B)(1), corporate form is not enough to reason that 
corporations may not exercise religion because not-
profit corporations may exercise religion373 The fact 
that corporations seek profit is also not enough to 
disqualify for-profit corporations under RFRA, because 
a sole proprietorship may make free exercise claims.374 
In addition, laws in all fifty states allow corporations 
to form “for any lawful purpose” and “modern 
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to 
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and 
many do not do so.”375 In fact, Justice Alito added, 
“[f]or-profit corporations, with ownership approval, 
support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not 
at all uncommon for such corporations to further 
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.”376 The 
majority’s point was that because corporations are able 
to support environmental and charitable causes they are 
also able to exercise religion. 
 
371 Id. (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). 
372 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. 
373 Id. at 2769. 
374 Id. at 2770. 
375 Id. at 2771. 
376 Id. 
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III(B)(3) 
RFRA BROADER 
THAN PRE-SMITH 
LAW 
Part III(B)(3) attacked the government’s argument 
that RFRA only codified pre-Smith precedent and such 
precedent never held that for-profit corporations have 
free exercise rights.377 The majority opinion stated that 
this argument was incorrect because: (1) RFRA has 
never been tied to the then-existing Supreme Court 
cases before Smith: instead, RFRA was tied to the 
“exercise of religion under the First Amendment” (a 
much broader scope);378 (2) RLUIPA severed RFRA’s 
definition of religion to the ties of pre-Smith law; (3) 
“the one pre-Smith case involving the free-exercise 
rights of a for-profit corporation suggests, if anything, 
that for-profit corporations possess such rights [to 
exercise religion]”;379 and (4) the results would 
be absurd if RFRA merely restored this 
Court’s pre-Smith decisions in ossified form 
and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA 
claim unless that plaintiff fell within a 
category of plaintiffs one of whom had 
brought a free-exercise claim that this Court 
entertained in the years before Smith. For 
example, we are not aware of any pre-Smith 
case in which this Court entertained a free-
exercise claim brought by a resident 
noncitizen. Are such persons also beyond 
RFRA’s protective reach simply because the 
Court never addressed their rights before 
Smith?380 
This pre-Smith precedent claim was not the 
government’s strongest argument considering the 
explicit text of RFRA—specifically its least restrictive 
means prong which played little if any part in pre-Smith 
law. 
III(B)(4) 
COURTS CAN 
DETERMINE 
CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
Part III(B)(4) held that it is possible to determine the 
sincerity of a corporation’s religious beliefs—especially 
the religious beliefs of a closely held corporation like 
Hobby Lobby. The government had argued that it would 
be difficult to measure the religious sincerity of a large, 
publicly traded corporation.381 The Court did not 
disagree but argued that the Hobby Lobby case does 
“not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems 
 
377 Id. at 2771–72. 
378 Id. at 2772. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 2773. 
381 Id. at 2774. 
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unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS 
refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not 
pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation 
asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical 
restraints would likely prevent that from occurring.”382 
The Court stated that state corporate law would help 
determine the outcome of fights about religion among 
bickering corporate shareholders.383 
IV(A) 
SUBSTANTIAL 
BURDEN 
Part IV(A) moved on to discuss RFRA’s 
requirement that the mandate substantially burdens 
Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise. The Court held that 
it does substantially burden religious exercise because 
of the large penalties the corporation will face if it 
ignores the mandate.384 Whether the burden is $475 
million for ignoring the mandate or $26 million for 
dropping its insurance plan, the Court found both to be 
substantial.385 
IV(B) 
HOBBY LOBBY 
NEED NOT 
ELIMINATE ITS 
INSURANCE POLICY 
 
Part IV(B) attacked the argument that it might be 
cheaper for Hobby Lobby to eliminate its insurance and 
pay the $2,000 penalty per employee. The elimination 
of Hobby Lobby’s policy would allow employees to 
receive their contraceptive entitlement, cost the 
company less (because the $26 million tax penalty 
would cost less than providing insurance for 13,000 
employees), and, therefore, eliminate the mandate’s 
substantial burden.386 The Court disapproved of this 
argument for a number of reasons. First, it was raised by 
a so-called friend of the court in amicus curiae briefs, 
and not by the government itself in the case.387 This is a 
big no-no in litigation. If you want a court to consider 
an issue, you must raise it in court. As Justice Alito put 
it: “We do not generally entertain arguments that were 
not raised below and are not advanced in this Court by 
any party . . . and there are strong reasons to adhere to 
that practice in these cases.”388 The problem with 
considering arguments not raised in court is that neither 
party has a fair chance to brief and argue for or against 
the position. 
 
 
382 Id. 
383 Id. at 2774–75. 
384 Id. at 2775–76. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. at 2776. 
387 Id. 
388 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Further, the majority stated, even if it were to 
consider the argument about eliminating the insurance 
plan, the argument would not be persuasive because: (1) 
the Green family has religious reasons for offering 
insurance, and (2) it is not clear whether this option 
would actually be cheaper than providing insurance.389 
Health insurance is a valuable benefit to employees, and 
the company would have to increase wages in order to 
stay competitive in the employment marketplace.390 
This increase in wages would occur along with paying 
the ACA noncompliance tax and, therefore, the Court 
held, “it is far from clear that it would be financially 
advantageous for an employer to drop coverage and pay 
the penalty.”391 
IV(C) 
COURTS SHALL 
NOT MEDDLE IN 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
Part IV(C) attacked the government’s argument that 
the use of contraceptives is too attenuated from the 
company’s payment to cover employee insurance to 
matter under RFRA. The Court warned that it is not 
appropriate for a court to second-guess a party’s 
religious belief as to where to draw the line at when it 
must refuse to facilitate abortions.392 This distinction is 
a purely religious matter for the adherent to come to 
terms with absent governmental interference and the 
Court has held as much before.393 
V(A) 
ONE OF HHS’ 
INTERESTS 
CONCEDED AS 
COMPELLING 
Part V(A) began the compelling interest and least 
restrictive means analysis required under RFRA. The 
Court stated that the government provided two very 
broad, compelling interests: (1) promoting public health 
and (2) promoting gender equality.394 These were the 
same interests it proposed in the Tenth Circuit. Justice 
Alito stated that RFRA requires a “more focused 
inquiry” or, more specifically, RFRA “requires the 
Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest 
test is satisfied through application of the challenged 
law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose 
sincere exercise of religion is being substantially 
burdened.”395 This demonstration did not happen with 
these two broad interests. 
 
 
389 Id. at 2777. 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
392 Id. at 2778–79. 
393 Id. at 2778 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981)). 
394 Id. at 2779–80. 
395 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The government also provided a narrower, 
compelling interest—to insure that women have cost-
free access to contraceptives because the more 
expensive contraceptives become the less women use 
them.396 The Court could not come to a definitive 
conclusion on whether this interest was compelling and, 
therefore, punted: “We will assume that the interest in 
guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged 
contraceptive methods is compelling within the 
meaning of RFRA.”397 It is likely that the majority 
conceded this prong because it was about to hold that 
even this interest was not the least restrictive manner of 
meeting the government’s goals as required by RFRA. 
V(B) 
GOVERNMENT DID 
NOT CHOOSE 
LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE 
Justice Alito began Part V(B) with this sentence: 
“The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally 
demanding . . . and it is not satisfied here.”398 And with 
those fourteen words, the contraceptive mandate’s 
application to Hobby Lobby was doomed. In making 
this conclusion, the Court detailed two less restrictive 
alternatives to the mandate: (1) the government could 
pay for the four contraceptives to be delivered to 
women whose employer objects to the mandate on 
religious grounds, and/or (2) the workaround for 
religious non-profit corporations could be used for 
closely held for-profit corporations.399 The Court 
expected the government to provide some figures as to 
how much paying for the contraceptives itself would 
cost (at least an estimate of the average cost per 
employee).400 The Court also stated: “Nor has HHS 
provided any statistics regarding the number of 
employees who might be affected because they work for 
corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . Nor has HHS told 
us that it is unable to provide such statistics.”401 In the 
end, the majority expected HHS to make arguments for 
less restrictive alternatives and provide figures for such 
arguments. It is understandable why HHS chose not to 
spend much time on the issue as that would go against 
 
 
396 Id. at 2780. 
397 Id. 
398 Id. (citation omitted). 
399 Id. at 2780–82. 
400 Id. at 2780 (“HHS has not provided any estimate of the average cost per employee 
of providing access to these contraceptives, two of which, according to the FDA, are 
designed primarily for emergency use.”). 
401 Id. at 2780–81. 
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its belief that the mandate is the most effective way to 
meet its interests. 
Importantly, the Court took no position on whether 
this workaround would apply to all claims by religious 
corporations but stated that it would work for Hobby 
Lobby.402 
V(C) 
REBUTTING 
ARGUMENTS BY 
HHS & THE 
PRINCIPAL DISSENT 
In Part V(C), the majority took the time to criticize a 
few major points of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and a 
few HHS arguments. The majority first took issue with 
the dissent’s claim that a ruling for Hobby Lobby will 
cause religious claimants to come out of the woodwork 
and make RFRA claims because they do not want to 
pay for vaccinations or blood transfusions.403 Justice 
Alito countered, “HHS points to no evidence that 
insurance plans in existence prior to the enactment of 
ACA excluded coverage for such items. Nor has HHS 
provided evidence that any significant number of 
employers sought exemption, on religious grounds, 
from any of ACA’s coverage requirements other than 
the contraceptive mandate.”404 Here again the majority 
chastised HHS for failing to provide enough evidence 
for its arguments. Justice Alito continued: 
Our decision should not be understood to hold 
that an insurance-coverage mandate must 
necessarily fall if it conflicts with an 
employer’s religious beliefs. Other coverage 
requirements, such as immunizations, may be 
supported by different interests (for example, 
the need to combat the spread of infectious 
diseases) and may involve different arguments 
about the least restrictive means of providing 
them.405 
Second, Justice Alito countered the dissent’s 
prediction that a ruling for Hobby Lobby would lead to 
other religious employers attempting employment 
discrimination and cloaking it “as religious practice to 
escape legal sanction.”406 The majority claimed that the 
government “has a compelling interest in providing an 
equal opportunity to participate in the workforce 
without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial 
 
402 Id. at 2782. 
403 Id. at 2783. 
404 Id. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
2014] Religious Freedom and Closely Held Corporations: The  331 
Hobby Lobby Case and Its Ethical Implications 
PART ANALYSIS 
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that 
critical goal.”407 
Third, Justice Alito countered the government’s 
argument that the contraceptive mandate is part of a 
comprehensive system, like the Social Security system 
in Lee, that does not work unless as many people as 
possible participate.408 The majority argued that paying 
taxes, as was the case in Lee, is much different from 
providing contraceptives under the mandate.409 This is 
because there is no less restrictive alternative to paying 
taxes (chaos would ensue if taxpayers could claim 
exemptions from taxes on religious grounds), but there 
are less restrictive alternatives to requiring employers to 
provide contraceptives their religion forbids them from 
providing.410 
Finally, the majority claimed that the dissent really 
just had a problem with the breadth of RFRA and that 
the dissenters would prefer to go back to the rational 
basis test for generally applicable laws from the 
decision in Smith.411 In response, Justice Alito replied, 
that 
Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the 
position that “the compelling interest test as 
set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a 
workable test for striking sensible balances 
between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests.” . . . The wisdom of 
Congress’s judgment on this matter is not our 
concern. Our responsibility is to enforce 
RFRA as written, and under the standard that 
RFRA prescribes, the HHS contraceptive 
mandate is unlawful.412 
And, with that, Hobby Lobby’s victory was 
secured. 
In the end, the Court held that the “contraceptive mandate, as 
applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on 
that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First 
 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 2783. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 2784. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. at 2785. 
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Amendment” claims.413 The case was remanded back to the lower 
courts for “further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”414 
2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy concurred briefly to make a few points. First, he 
emphasized that the majority opinion considered that the 
government’s interest in promoting the health of female employees is 
compelling.415 The majority conceded this point so it could move on 
to the least restrictive prong, but Justice Kennedy reiterated that the 
Court found the interest compelling nonetheless. The majority’s 
concession on this matter will be helpful to the government in future 
cases in which it proffers promoting women’s health as a compelling 
interest. Second, Justice Kennedy made the point that the government 
had a less restrictive alternative in the workaround for religious non-
profit corporations.416 Justice Kennedy was not fond of the majority’s 
statement that another less restrictive alternative in the case would be 
for the government to create an entirely new program to pay for the 
contraceptives. But, he praised the majority for not delving into the 
issue of whether RFRA can require the government to create a new 
program as a less restrictive alternative.417 In the end, the workaround 
was good enough. 
3. The Dissenters 
As mentioned above, two dissents were filed in the case. Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent stands as the primary dissent because it: (1) was 
joined (at least in part) by four Justices, (2) contained a lengthy 
discussion of the dissenters’ position, and (3) was referred to as such 
by the majority. Justice Kennedy, a member of the majority, took the 
rare step of referring to this opinion as a “respectful and powerful 
dissent.”418 Justice Ginsburg began by recoiling at what she called the 
“startling breadth” of the majority’s decision.419 In her opinion, the 
majority allowed “commercial enterprises, including corporations, 
along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, [to] opt out of any 
law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their 
 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 2785–86. 
416 Id. 
417 Id. 
418 Id. at 2785. 
419 Id. at 2787. 
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sincerely held religious beliefs.”420 This conclusion is the polar 
opposite of the holding in Smith. Justice Ginsburg also found that, 
under the majority opinion: 
Compelling governmental interests in uniform compliance with the 
law, and disadvantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on 
others [like third parties], hold no sway . . . at least when there is a 
“less restrictive alternative.” And such an alternative, the Court 
suggests, there always will be whenever, in lieu of tolling an 
enterprise claiming a religion-based exemption, the government, 
i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab.421 
Evaluating the substance of the Court’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
opined that the majority did not “pretend” that the Free Exercise 
Clause authorized “religion-based accommodations so extreme.”422 
Instead, it relied on a very broad reading of RFRA.423 She exclaimed: 
In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit 
corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that 
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of 
women employed by Hobby Lobby . . . or dependents of persons 
those corporations employ. Persuaded that Congress enacted RFRA 
to serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the havoc the 
Court’s judgment can introduce, I dissent.424 
The problem to Justice Ginsburg was that the Senate “voted down 
the so-called ‘conscience amendment,’ which would have enabled 
any employer or insurance provider to deny coverage based on its 
asserted ‘religious beliefs or moral convictions.’”425 The fact that the 
Senate let this legislation die indicated to Justice Ginsburg a 
congressional intent to leave health care decisions to women and their 
doctors.426 She also worried that the majority opinion failed to give 
proper guidance to lower courts on cases in which for-profit 
corporations claimed their owners’ religious exercise prohibited them 
from following the law.427 She listed a litany of past cases in which 
courts would have a tough time applying the RFRA standard as 
interpreted by the majority: (1) an “owner of [a] restaurant chain 
 
420 Id. 
421 Id. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. at 2789. 
426 See id. 
427 Id. at 2804. 
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refused to serve black patrons based on his religious beliefs opposing 
racial integration;”428 (2) “born-again Christians who owned closely 
held, for-profit health clubs believed that the Bible proscribed hiring 
or retaining an ‘individual[l] living with but not married to a person of 
the opposite sex,’ ‘a young, single woman working without her 
father’s consent or a married woman working without her husband’s 
consent,’ and any person ‘antagonistic to the Bible,’ including 
‘fornicators and homosexuals;’”429 and (3) a “for-profit photography 
business owned by a husband and wife refused to photograph a 
lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony based on the religious beliefs 
of the company’s owners.”430 
In the end, Justice Ginsburg would have confined religious 
exemptions under RFRA to organizations formed “‘for a religious 
purpose,’ ‘engage[d] primarily in carrying out that religious purpose,’ 
and not ‘engaged . . . substantially in the exchange of goods or 
services for money beyond nominal amounts.’”431 For-profit 
corporations like Hobby Lobby, obviously, would not qualify under 
her test. 
Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented together with a brief statement 
that read in its entirety: 
We agree with Justice Ginsburg that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
contraceptive coverage requirement fails on the merits. We need not 
and do not decide whether either for-profit corporations or their 
owners may bring claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993. Accordingly, we join all but Part III-C-1 of Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.432 
This short dissent is very interesting because it could indicate that 
seven of the Court’s nine Justices are willing to consider for-profit 
corporations as persons under RFRA. The following chart 
summarizes the timeline and outcome of the confusing legal 
proceedings in the Hobby Lobby case. 
  
 
428 Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (S.C. 1966)). 
429 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804–05 (citing In re Minnesota ex rel. McClure, 370 
N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985)). 
430 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (citing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 
P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)). 
431 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805–06 (citation omitted). 
432  Id. at 2806. 
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TABLE 2. The Hobby Lobby Case: Timeline and Outcomes 
PROCEEDING DATE OF DECISION COURT OUTCOME 
Hobby Lobby sues 
HHS & requests 
preliminary 
injunction 
Sept. 12, 2012 
(Lawsuit filed) 
November 19, 2012 
(Opinion handed 
down) 
District Court for the 
Western District of 
Oklahoma 
Injunction denied 
Hobby Lobby 
appeals the denial 
of the preliminary 
injunction 
December 20, 2012 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Denial of 
injunction 
affirmed by two-
judge panel 
Hobby Lobby 
appeals the denial 
of the preliminary 
injunction 
December 26, 2012 United States Supreme Court 
Denial of 
injunction 
affirmed (in 
chambers 
opinion by 
Justice 
Sotomayor) 
Hobby Lobby 
requests en banc 
consideration of its 
request for 
injunction 
June 27, 2013 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Case remanded 
to district court 
to review all 
three factors of 
preliminary 
injunction 
standard 
Case remanded to 
district court July 19, 2013 
District Court for the 
Western District of 
Oklahoma 
Preliminary 
injunction issued 
Supreme Court 
grants certiorari November 26, 2013 
United States 
Supreme Court 
Oral argument & 
briefing 
scheduled 
Supreme Court 
issues its decision June 30, 2014 
United States 
Supreme Court 
Hobby Lobby 
wins & case 
remanded to 
implement 
decision 
The final substantive part of this Article discusses the major ethical 
issues spun off from the Hobby Lobby decision. This analysis will 
take into consideration the stories of the litigants, the history of 
religious freedom in America, the case and statutory law governing 
the field, and the court decisions in the case. 
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IV 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION 
The Supreme Court made the right decision to grant certiorari in 
the Hobby Lobby case. The Court was the only body able to bring 
clarity to the very difficult and increasingly relevant legal dilemma of 
whether closely held, for-profit corporations are covered by RFRA 
and whether the mandate substantially burdened religion. The Court’s 
decision also seems appropriate considering: (1) the important place 
religious exercise holds in the fabric of America, today and 
historically, (2) the broad brush with which Congress painted RFRA, 
and (3) the fact that Hobby Lobby’s employees will still receive 
sixteen of the twenty FDA-approved contraceptives at no cost. 
Another plus is that Congress remains free to amend RFRA and its 
definition of religion if a majority of legislators are dissatisfied with 
the judicial outcome. The Hobby Lobby decision should be somewhat 
palatable to the government as well because women still receive 
contraceptives at no cost under the Religious Non-Profit Workaround 
(which now needs a new name). 
The case did, however, create a myriad of new legal dilemmas. For 
example, what happens when one shareholder—a person of faith—
takes control of a public corporation and desires to remove these same 
four contraceptives from the company’s insurance plan? The majority 
opinion in Hobby Lobby confines the immediate holding to closely 
held corporations and claims that corporate giants are unlikely to 
make RFRA claims. But, what if the day comes that someone akin to 
David Green (someone worth five billion dollars or so) buys a 
majority stake in a public company? In addition, it remains to be seen 
what is left of the Smith precedent now that individuals, non-profit 
corporations, sole proprietorships, and for-profit corporations are 
covered by RFRA. Does that groundbreaking case now have any 
contemporary relevance when religious adherents can file a claim 
under a statute that broadly protects their religious exercise? It is very 
likely that, in the near future, a slew of law review articles will tackle 
these legal dilemmas and others in depth. The legal community and 
popular press are already abuzz with analysis of the legal 
controversies stemming from the case. 
The final substantive part of this Article takes a different approach 
and will evaluate a few major ethical dilemmas created by the Court’s 
Hobby Lobby decision. These ethical dilemmas deal with concepts 
such as consequences, the greatest good for the greatest number, the 
duty of a person or a corporation in a society, the means one takes to 
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accomplish a goal, and the virtues that lead to happiness. These 
dilemmas are also ethical in nature, as they do not rely on the law for 
guidance, and because legal precedent does not control the search for 
the truth. In other words, this Part will take a refreshing look at a 
controversial legal case. In the end, this Part does not endeavor to 
answer these ethical questions. That is a task for another article and 
another day. The goal is to create a roadmap that lays out some of the 
most important ethical dilemmas facing the nation post-Hobby Lobby. 
Each Section below will present the dilemma using language from 
the Court’s Hobby Lobby opinion. Then, the dilemma will be 
rephrased in a shorter and more general fashion. Each Section will 
then analyze the major positions on both sides of the ethical dilemma. 
A. Ethical Dilemma #1: The Devout Corporation Dilemma 
1. The Language from the Hobby Lobby Opinion 
 As we will show, Congress provided protection for people like 
the . . . Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included 
corporations within RFRA’s definition of “persons.” But it is 
important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to 
provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a 
form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. 
An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of 
the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who 
are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When 
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. . . . 
And protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby 
Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and 
control those companies. . . . [It has been argued that:] “General 
business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions 
or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise 
religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take 
other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the 
intention and direction of their individual actors.” . . . All of this is 
true—but quite beside the point. Corporations, “separate and apart 
from” the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, 
cannot do anything at all.433 
 
433 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (citing Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
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2. The Resulting Ethical Dilemma 
The dilemma posed by this statement can be phrased a few 
different ways: first, may a corporation actually exercise religion? Or, 
is it ethical for the people who own corporations to transpose their 
religious beliefs onto the corporation as its official religious beliefs? 
This dilemma stirred up emotions on both sides of the Hobby 
Lobby debate. If one can get beyond the entirely one-sided 
arguments,434 this dilemma actually presents a very difficult question 
from many non-legal perspectives. From the philosophical 
perspective, what does it mean to be religious? Is religion relegated to 
the human mind? Are corporations merely an extension of the minds 
of the humans who own them? From the theological perspective, does 
it matter the form in which someone practices religion? Does God 
care if owners of a corporation play Christian music for their 
customers? Would God be upset if a religious owner did business on 
the Sabbath or provided money for contraceptives that might end a 
human life? From a relational perspective, how important is it for 
religious people to express their beliefs at home and in the 
workplace? This ethical dilemma can be styled the “Devout 
Corporation Dilemma.” Two positions emerge on either side of this 
dilemma, and this Section analyzes them in turn. 
a. The “Religion as Inherently Human” Position 
The basis of this position is that religion is reserved for rational, 
thinking human beings. It is as impossible for an animal to believe in 
God as it is for a legal fiction such as a corporation. This position has 
three primary arguments, and each will be discussed in turn. 
First, religion is a very personal matter and only makes sense if 
contemplated in the mind of a rational human being. For example, 
only human beings pray, worship, attend religious services, and 
 
434 See, e.g., Sen. Marc Begich, My Turn: Hobby Lobby Decision Should Outrage 
Alaskans, JUNEAU EMPIRE (July 24, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://juneauempire.com/opinion 
/2014-07-24/my-turn-hobby-lobby-decision-should-outrage-alaskans#.U9l20ahHuKY (“In 
late June, a narrow majority of five male [J]ustices issued an opinion . . . in which for-
profit companies challenged the guarantee that women receive health insurance coverage 
of birth control of her choice without cost-sharing. As Alaskans, we don’t want the 
government intruding into our lives and telling us how to make personal decisions. Bosses 
should not be able to dictate family planning and birth control options for Alaska women.  
. . . The simple fact that 99 percent of women will use contraceptives at some point in their 
lives shows just how out-of-touch this decision is. As a result of the Hobby Lobby case, 
more than 60,000 Alaska women could be denied access to the affordable birth control and 
reproductive care options that work best for them.”). 
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believe in a higher power. Corporations cannot physically undertake 
these solemn religious rights. Instead, a corporation is merely an 
“artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law” and is, therefore, unable to possess such an 
inherently “human” right.435 Justice Ginsburg touched on this 
position in her Hobby Lobby dissent stating, “the exercise of religion 
is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.”436 
Advocates for this position harken back to James Madison who said: 
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth “that religion, 
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction . . . .” 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise 
it as these may dictate.437 
One hang-up for this position is that religious non-profits are 
treated more closely to a religious individual than a for-profit 
corporation. The majority made this point in the case—the corporate 
form cannot be the reason for treating non-profits and for-profits 
differently, so is the profit motive enough? The “Religion as 
Inherently Human” position would not classify religious non-profits 
as exercising religion but would claim that religious people associate 
with them in order to practice religion in a communal setting. As 
Judge Heaton found in denying Hobby Lobby’s preliminary 
injunction, this is just not the case with for-profit corporations. 
The second primary argument posited by this position is that 
allowing corporations to exercise religion opens the door for 
fraudsters and profiteers to come out of the woodwork. After Hobby 
Lobby, owners of for-profit businesses now have an incentive to claim 
a religious exemption to many generally applicable laws. Some of 
these claimed burdens will be sincere, as was the case with Hobby 
Lobby, while others will surely be insincere. These fraudsters will 
make the religious case, but the real reason behind their complaints 
will be the fact that these generally applicable laws hamper their 
profits or make business transactions more burdensome. This issue 
becomes more relevant when one recognizes that closely held 
businesses employ around fifty-three percent of all working 
 
435 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 385 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
436 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794. 
437 MADISON, supra note 76. 
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Americans.438 A rash of insincere claims by these owners will mean 
that many millions of employees will be negatively affected by people 
taking advantage of the Hobby Lobby precedent. 
Third, the very point of the corporate form is to allow the owners 
of a corporation to separate and protect themselves from the liability 
of the corporation when things go wrong. Incorporating allow owners 
to become rich if the company succeeds but remain protected from 
losing everything if the company incurs a great deal of debt, makes 
mistakes, or fails.439 Owners of corporations are protected because, in 
a bankruptcy or after winning a judgment, creditors can generally go 
after the assets of a business but not the personal assets of its owners. 
This protection is referred to as the corporate veil, and it has been 
historically difficult to pierce. The only way this works is if the owner 
and the corporation are seen as separate entities. The Supreme Court 
took this separate entities position in a case involving Don King, the 
famous boxing promoter: 
[L]inguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are 
different “persons,” even where the employee is the corporation’s 
sole owner. After all, incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a 
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and 
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who 
created it, who own it, or whom it employs.440 
The “Religion as Inherently Human” position posits that it is 
unethical for business owners to take advantage of the separation 
from their corporation when desirable (to protect their assets from 
creditors or for tax purposes) and then reunite when free exercise of 
religion works in their favor. Indeed, if the veil may be pierced in 
religious exercise cases (in other words, if the owners and the 
corporation are seen as united) might it also be the ethical course for 
courts to pierce the veil more easily to accommodate creditors? 
b. The “Corporate Conduit” Position 
Justice Alito took this position in his majority opinion in the Hobby 
Lobby case. The general idea is that a corporation exists merely to do 
 
438 Alison Griswold, How Many People Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Affect?, SLATE 
(June 30, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/06/30/hobby 
_lobby_supreme_court_ruling_how_many_people_work_at_closely_held_corporations 
.html. 
439 See Lawrence E. Rafferty, Corporate Veil and Hobby Lobby (July 13, 2014), 
http://jonathanturley.org/2014/07/13/corporate-veil-and-hobby-lobby/. 
440 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). 
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what a majority of its shareholders desire. In fact, a corporation 
cannot legally act outside of the will of a majority of its owners. In 
other words, a corporation is nothing more than a conduit that makes 
it easier, safer, and more efficient to conduct business. The beliefs and 
opinions of the owners travel through and are expressed by this 
conduit. For example: 
 If the majority of stockholders decide that a corporation should 
publicize speech on political or moral issues, then the corporation 
will engage in such speech on their behalf. Similarly, stockholders 
can use corporations to adhere to a variety of secular moral 
principles. Some corporations boycotted apartheid South Africa 
because of the stockholders’ moral abhorrence of racism. If people 
can and do use publicly traded corporations to speak out on political 
issues or adhere to secular moral principles, then the same goes for 
religious principles. For example, the majority stockholders of a 
firm may choose to adhere to Orthodox Jewish religious law, and 
therefore refuse to do business on the sabbath [sic].441 
One of the strongest arguments in favor of this position is that 
corporations need not seek profit as their only or even one of their 
primary goals. It is both ethical and legal for the owners to require 
that their corporation seek other goals, such as social responsibility. 
And many corporations in America have attempted to be good 
corporate citizens.442 For years, American business schools have been 
teaching this idea and referring to it as Corporate Social 
Responsibility, or the Triple Bottom Line.443 In general, these names 
refer to the idea that corporations should seek profits, return on 
investment and shareholder value while also remaining conscious of 
the effects of corporate activity on the environment and the larger 
 
441 Ilya Somin, Can People “Exercise Religion” Through Publicly Traded 
Corporations?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/12/can-people-exercise-religion-through-publicly    
-traded-corporations/ (citing and elaborating on an argument by David Post who had 
engaged in a debate over this issue). 
442 See Analysis Grades Sustainability Reporting of 120 Companies, RELIABLE PLANT, 
http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/17733/analysis-grades-sustainability-reporting-of-120 
-companies (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
443 See Cindy Tickle, Top Business Schools Integrating Corporate Social 
Responsibility, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME (Oct. 22, 2009), http://business.nd.edu/news 
_and_events/mendoza_in_the_news/article.aspx?id=4543 (listing the top ten American 
business schools focused on corporate social responsibility in 2009–10). 
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community.444 In other words, a corporation should seek to be 
profitable as well as environmentally and socially responsible. 
Some corporations have been on the cutting edge of social change 
in terms of labor standards in countries used to produce goods and 
source materials.445 Other companies have strong environmental 
policies to reduce waste and carbon emissions into the atmosphere.446 
Corporate shareholders have joined together to lead movements to 
force their corporations to pay more attention to social and 
environmental concerns.447 Others have joined the fair-trade 
movement, which “adds its brand to products that have been produced 
and traded in an environmentally and socially ‘fair’ way.”448 Though 
debate exists in the literature, many business leaders argue ardently 
 
444 See Triple Bottom Line, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com 
/node/14301663. The creator of the concept was John Elkington. See generally JOHN 
ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY 
BUSINESS (New Society Publishers 1998). 
445 See, e.g., Participating Companies, FAIR LABOR ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org 
/affiliates/participating-companies (last visited July 31, 2014) (“As part of FLA, some of 
the world’s leading brands have committed to ensuring fair labor practices and safe and 
humane working conditions throughout their supply chains. Companies that have 
committed to FLA’s Code of Conduct and established systems to identify and remedy 
ethical violations are making significant strides towards that goal. These companies are 
working with FLA to develop and improve social compliance systems that flag issues and 
lead to sustainable solutions when workers are at risk. Companies join the FLA on a 
voluntary basis, but they must meet strict labor standards for as long as they are affiliated. 
FLA holds Participating Companies accountable for monitoring 100% of their own supply 
chains . . . .”). 
446 See, e.g., Kamelia Angelova & Jay Yarow, The 15 Best Companies for the Planet, 
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2009, 8:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-15-best        
-companies-for-the-environment-2009-9?op=1 (“Here’s the 15 best companies for the 
environment based on a complicated methodology that assessed environmental impact, 
green policies and reputation. Newsweek came up with the rankings after working with 
environmental consultants for over a year.”). 
447 See, e.g., About ICCR, INTERFAITH CTR. FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, 
http://www.iccr.org/about-iccr (last visited July 30, 2014) (“The Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility is a coalition of faith and values-driven organizations who view 
the management of their investments as a powerful catalyst for social change. Our 
membership comprises nearly 300 organizations including faith-based institutions, socially 
responsible asset management companies, unions, pension funds and colleges and 
universities that collectively represent over $100 billion in invested capital. 
 ICCR members and staff engage hundreds of multinational corporations annually to 
promote more sustainable and just practices because we believe in doing so they will 
secure a better future for their employees, their customers and their shareholders.”). 
448 Triple Bottom Line, supra note 444 (“From small beginnings, the movement has 
picked up steam in the past five years. Nevertheless, the Fairtrade movement is still only 
small, focused essentially on coffee, tea, bananas and cotton, and accounting for less than 
0.2% of all UK grocery sales in 2006.”). 
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that being a socially responsible corporation is also profitable.449 For 
example, a recent study shows that a person’s “willingness to buy, 
recommend, work for, and invest in a company is driven 60% by . . . 
perceptions of the company—or it’s reputation, and only 40% by . . . 
perceptions of the products or services it sells.”450 Prominent 
companies have gone down this path and received international 
acclaim: 
 Ben and Jerry’s ice cream offers one prominent example; the 
company uses only fair trade ingredients and developed a dairy 
farm sustainability program in its home state of Vermont. Starbucks 
has created its C.A.F.E. Practices guidelines, which are designed to 
ensure the company sources sustainably grown and processed 
coffee by evaluating the economic, social and environmental 
aspects of coffee production. Tom’s Shoes, another notable example 
of a company with CSR at its core, donates one pair of shoes to a 
child in need for every pair a customer purchases.451 
It is a mainstream belief that corporations act ethically when they 
seek a corporate conscience—especially when it comes to the 
environment and social causes. However, this so-called corporate 
conscience is not found in the building in which the corporation is 
based or on the piece of paper that authorizes it to do business. 
Instead, the corporate conscience belongs to the people that own the 
corporation and possess the beliefs that the corporation expresses. 
These people employ their corporation as a conduit to express their 
beliefs. 
Because corporate responsibility is accepted, and even praised, it 
would make little sense for the corporate conscience to be 
inapplicable to other beliefs such as religion. In other words, if a 
company is allowed to publicly express its belief in a clean 
environment, fair labor practices, or fair-trade products publicly, then 
it must also be allowed to express its religious beliefs publically.  
Similarly, if an employer is allowed to impose a reasonable 
environmental footprint policy regarding climate change on its 
 
449 See, e.g., Donna Fenn, Shhh, It’s a Secret: Being Socially Responsible Pays Off, 
CBS NEWS (May 11, 2011, 8:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shhh-its-a-secret     
-being-socially-responsible-pays-off/. 
450 Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies with the Best CSR Reputations, FORBES (Oct. 2, 
2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/10/02/the-companies 
-with-the-best-csr-reputations-2/ (citing a study by the Reputation Institute). 
451 Nicole Fallon, What is Corporate Social Responsibility?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Feb. 
27, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4679-corporate-social-respon 
sibility.html. 
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employees,452 then it also must be ethical for an employer to impose 
reasonable policies influenced by religion on its employees. 
Otherwise, the distinction begins to look like ideological and political 
warfare instead of a principled stance based on ethics. 
Another important ethical argument on this side of the debate is the 
one that the Green family made in the Hobby Lobby case—the idea of 
a calling to a vocation. Because many religious people see their faith 
as infused into every area of their life, it is unacceptable for the law to 
force them to feign faithlessness in the workplace. In other words, it is 
unfair to allow people to incorporate as a non-profit or sole 
proprietorship and exercise their religion as they wish but then take 
that right away merely because the same people undertake the same 
conduct under a for-profit structure. Green expressed this position 
well: “You can’t have a belief system on Sunday and not live it the 
other six days.”453 
B. Ethical Dilemma #2: The Third Party Problem 
1. The Language from the Hobby Lobby Opinion (Justice Ginsburg in 
Dissent) 
 In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-
profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that 
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of 
women employed by Hobby Lobby . . . or dependents of persons 
those corporations employ.454 
2. The Resulting Ethical Dilemma 
Is it ethical for a corporation to impose its religious beliefs on third 
parties (i.e., its employees)—especially employees who do not agree 
with the corporation’s religious beliefs? What about when the 
corporation’s religious beliefs cause its employees to involuntarily 
lose a government-granted entitlement? 
 
452 See Corporate Environmental Policy, MCGRAW-HILL COS., http://www.mcgraw     
-hill.com/Content/cr/environmental-policy.pdf (last visited July 30, 2014) (discussing 
measures the company is taking to reduce its impact on climate change, and stating that 
the company will continue “to engage employees through programs such as the Green 
Teams and Personal Sustainability Practice (PSP) module to reduce the Corporation’s 
environmental footprint”). 
453 Brian Solomon, David Green: Biblical Billionaire, FORBES, Oct. 8, 2012, at 116, 
118, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2012/09/18/david-green-the           
-biblical-billionaire-backing-the-evangelical-movement/. 
454 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014). 
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Employees who work for corporations are forced to follow the 
organization’s rules all the time. Oftentimes, these rules take 
something of value from an employee. For example, some workplace 
rules require employees to wear uniforms they would prefer not to 
wear. Some employees might feel that this takes away their dignity. 
Other workplace rules forbid employees from conducting personal 
matters of any kind while at work. Some employees might feel that 
this takes away some of their freedom. Though there are lines, 
employers are granted a lot of leeway to tell employees what to do in 
return for a paycheck. 
Under the ACA, the government granted employees of large 
employers (fifty or more employees) the right to cost-free 
contraceptives. This is an entitlement (in this case, a right to benefits 
granted by the government) that Hobby Lobby took away, perhaps 
only in small part, by removing four controversial contraceptives455 
from its health insurance policy. The dilemma becomes whether it is 
ethical for an employer to take away a governmental provided 
entitlement granted to an employee (a third party or bystander in the 
dispute between the company and the government) based solely on 
the employer’s religious beliefs. This ethical dilemma can be called 
the “Third Party Problem.” 
 
455 See Brief for 67 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 
13-356), at 11 (“[T]he Catholic faith views the destruction of a human embryo at any time 
before conception-including during ‘the interval between conception and implantation of 
the embryo’ . . .-as an abortion, and gravely wrongful.” (citation omitted)); see also Brief 
for Catholic Med. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), at 2 (“Amicus opposes [the 
government’s] requirement that [Hobby Lobby] and other employers provide drugs and 
devices that can operate post-fertilization by preventing the implantation of existing 
human embryos in the endometrium, thereby terminating the pregnancy and killing the 
embryo.”). But see Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 
13-354), at 10 (“Abortificient has a precise meaning in the medical and scientific 
community and it refers to the termination of a pregnancy. Contraceptives that prevent 
fertilization from occurring, or even prevent implantation, are simply not abortifacients 
regardless of an individual’s personal or religious beliefs or mores.”). 
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a. The “Religion as Cornerstone” Position 
This posits that freedom of religion is a fundamental right that has 
played a pivotal role in American greatness.456 Freedom of religion 
encompasses “not only the right to believe (or not to believe), but also 
the right to express and to manifest religious beliefs. These rights are 
fundamental and should not be subject to political process and 
majority votes.”457 Buttressing this argument is the fact that the first 
words of the First Amendment to the Constitution deal with religious 
freedom. 
Subsequently, in RFRA, Congress sketched out even more 
expansive protections for religious beliefs and religious actions—
even when in conflict with laws meant to serve the greater good. 
RFRA was passed almost unanimously because the American public 
recognized that the Smith decision, and its diminution of religious 
freedom, was at odds with the principle of religious exercise as a 
fundamental right. The most logical conclusion is that Congress acted 
swiftly and decisively on RFRA because it knew it had a duty to right 
this wrong. Because religious freedom is so important to the fabric of 
the American experiment, protecting religion often trumps the rights 
of other parties. 
To summarize, this position holds that religious exercise is so 
important that, in a balancing test between freedom of religion on one 
side and an important governmental interest on the other, it will be 
extraordinarily difficult to tip the scales away from religion. This is 
true even if the required accommodations cause disruptions to the 
ordering of society through generally applicable laws. This side of the 
debate sees nothing unethical with a bias toward religious freedom. In 
fact, the Tenth Circuit expressed this position in its opinion on Hobby 
Lobby’s injunction request: 
 Accommodations for religion frequently operate by lifting a 
burden from the accommodated party and placing it elsewhere. The 
government itself has even taken this step with the contraceptive-
coverage requirement by accommodating certain religious 
employers, at the expense of their employees. That is part of 
accommodating religion—and is RFRA’s basic purpose.458 
 
456 Cf. The ACLU and Freedom of Religion and Belief, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/aclu-and-freedom-religion-and-belief (last visited July 
31, 2014). 
457 Id. 
458 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2013). 
CIOCCHETTI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:18 AM 
2014] Religious Freedom and Closely Held Corporations: The  347 
Hobby Lobby Case and Its Ethical Implications 
b. The “Third Party Rights” Position 
This position encapsulates the old adage that your right to swing 
your arms stops at the place where my nose begins.459 Or, in terms of 
religious freedom, a person’s freedom of religion stops when the 
religious practice begins to injure third parties. This is the position 
that the federal government spent the most time advocating for at oral 
argument in the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General kept pounding 
the point that Hobby Lobby was allowed to act on its religious beliefs 
concerning the facilitation of abortion, but the company’s decision to 
drop the four controversial contraceptives crossed the line. To hold 
otherwise, the Solicitor General argued, would cause the Court to find 
itself, “skating on thin constitutional ice.”460 Solicitor General Verrilli 
quoted Justice Jackson, who advocated for the “Third Party Rights” 
position: 
 Limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom begin to 
operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with the 
liberties of others or of the public. Adherence to that principle is 
what makes possible the harmonious functioning of a society like 
ours, in which people of every faith live and work side by side.461 
Third Party Rights adherents would advocate that the “real-world 
effect of giving corporations religious rights under RFRA or the First 
Amendment is not to deepen the corporations’ personal relationship 
with God, but to give their owners and managers the power to impose 
their religious and political beliefs on their employees.”462 Allowing 
this power imbalance is an unethical decision regardless of how the 
Supreme Court ruled on it as a legal matter. 
Justice Ginsburg proved to be a proponent of this position in her 
Hobby Lobby dissent. It is interesting that her position did not change 
even though the third parties she alleged were injured by Hobby 
Lobby’s religious beliefs still received contraceptives at no cost, 
except for the four FDA-approved methods that Hobby Lobby 
objected to providing (Plan B, Ella, and copper and hormonal IUDs). 
 
459 Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 
(1919). 
460 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 262, at 43. 
461 Id. at 41. 
462 Jamie Raskin, The Gospel of Citizens United: In Hobby Lobby, Corporations Pray 
for the Right to Deny Workers Contraception, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www 
.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/gospel-citizens-united-hobby-lobby-corporations        
-pray-right-deny-workers-co (last visited July 30, 2014). 
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Justice Ginsburg was not looking at the ends produced by the Court’s 
decision. Rather, she disagreed with the means the Court used to 
weight religious freedom more heavily than third party rights. 
Although she did not articulate the point in her dissent, she might 
argue that there will come a day when religious freedom will trump a 
compelling governmental interest, and the injured third parties will 
not be made whole as they were in the Hobby Lobby case. 
C. Ethical Dilemma #3: Is It Ethical for Government to Challenge 
Religious Beliefs? 
1. The Language from the Hobby Lobby Opinion 
The [Greens] believe that providing the coverage demanded by the 
HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a 
way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the 
coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important question 
of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under 
which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in 
itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the 
commission of an immoral act by another. Arrogating the authority 
to provide a binding national answer to this religious and 
philosophical question, HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell 
the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have 
repeatedly refused to take such a step. . . . 
[The Greens] sincerely believe that providing the insurance 
coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden 
side of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs 
are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our “narrow function . . . is to 
determine” whether the line drawn reflects “an honest 
conviction.”463 
2. The Resulting Ethical Dilemma 
Does the government act ethically by judging the sincerity or 
importance of a religious belief in an attempt to structure society in an 
orderly manner and protect the public via laws of general 
applicability? This dilemma can become very complex when the 
government attempts to organize society via generally applicable laws 
and religious adherents strenuously object and ask for an 
accommodation. The government, as the only party in the dispute 
with the power to grant an accommodation, is then forced to ponder 
issues such as whether the religious belief is really important enough 
to the adherent to merit an exemption or close enough in proximity to 
 
463 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778–79. 
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substantially burden religion. But is it even ethical for the government 
to evaluate religious beliefs at all? Is that not an issue best left 
between the adherent and her religious organization and doctrine? Or, 
is the most ethical decision to make all religious adherents prove only 
that their belief is sincere and then receive automatic 
accommodations? This latter conclusion seems wrong as people could 
feign religiousness to escape regulation or could create chaos in the 
system by opting out en masse. On the other end of the scale, must the 
government act ethically only by ensuring that the system it uses to 
grant or deny accommodations operates fairly? 
Tensions of this nature arose in the Hobby Lobby case when the 
government argued that the money the company spent on health care 
was too attenuated in time and circumstance from an employee’s 
eventual decision to have an abortion to matter. This is a sensitive 
question and there are two positions on this issue. This Section 
discusses them both. 
a. The “Government Must Govern” Position 
This position is basically a rehashing of Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Smith. The idea is that government needs to be able to 
govern effectively and efficiently using generally applicable laws. 
The taxpayers that support the government deserve no less. While any 
targeting of religion is per se unethical, there will be times when 
religious freedoms butt heads with laws that treat everyone the same 
and have no bias against religion. 
This position argues that it is ethical for the government to refuse 
to accommodate religion in these cases in order to structure society in 
an orderly way and protect the public from harm. In essence, this is a 
utilitarian argument whereby the ethical choice is the one that 
produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. There 
are more people in society who benefit from generally applicable laws 
than there are religious adherents who suffer. Consequently, generally 
applicable laws typically promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number, and supporting them over religious freedom, which will 
benefit fewer people, is the ethical choice. In order to make this 
utilitarian calculus and determine who will be hurt and who will be 
helped, the government must have the ability to evaluate religious 
beliefs. 
As noted above, this position was advocated in Hobby Lobby when 
the government argued that the decision to use one of the four 
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controversial contraceptives was far too attenuated to implicate the 
corporation in any potential abortion. The argument was that Hobby 
Lobby only paid money to a plan provider under certain terms to 
cover certain medicines and procedures. What the employees then 
decided to do with the benefits of their health insurance occurred later 
in time and was a personal matter between patients and their doctors. 
The contraceptive mandate is nothing more than a generally 
applicable law that benefits thousands of employees. On the other 
hand, a decision for Hobby Lobby benefits only the five members of 
the controlling ownership group. The most ethical choice, therefore, 
would have been for a court to conduct this analysis and rule against 
Hobby Lobby. 
b. The “Let Religions Ponder Religion” Position 
This position claims that the government has no right to determine 
whether a person’s religious beliefs are accurate, central to a 
particular adherent’s religion, or too attenuated to be substantially 
burdened. At most, to prevent fraudulent claims, the government may 
look into whether a religious belief is sincerely held. Beyond 
sincerity, any evaluation of religious belief must be left to the 
religious adherent to ponder, perhaps in consultation with other 
adherents or an official religious body. 
Supporters of this position would argue that, in the Hobby Lobby 
case, the government had no right to make any claim as to whether 
the Greens’ religion (evangelical Christianity) actually advocated that 
any of the four controversial contraceptives facilitated an abortion. 
Further, the government had no right to determine that the 
circumstances were too remote for the Greens’ religion to actually 
believe that the company was facilitating abortions through its health 
plan. This is, pure and simple, an assessment that the Greens must 
make in consultation with their religious texts and church doctrine, 
other religious adherents, and church leaders. The “Government Must 
Govern” position is less ethical because religious people must be 
allowed to ponder and come to conclusions on the real-world 
implications of their religious beliefs for themselves. 
CONCLUSIONS AND CALL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The Hobby Lobby case is a tale of two parties with powerful 
stories. Hobby Lobby is a closely held business controlled by a 
sincerely religious family and run according to Christian principles. 
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David Green found his calling in Hobby Lobby and endeavored to 
share the Christian message to the widest audience possible. To this 
end, he closes his stores on Sunday (the Sabbath day for many 
Christians) so his employees can celebrate their religions and spend 
time with their families. In addition, he donates “as much money to 
evangelical causes as anyone alive,”464 plays religious music in 
Hobby Lobby stores, and avoids stocking or transporting products 
that might reflect poorly on his Christian outreach. No one in the 
litigation made the argument that any of the owners of Hobby Lobby 
possessed anything other than sincere religious beliefs. When the 
company argued that the four contraceptives at issue violated their 
religious beliefs, they meant it. 
The federal government told the story of a nation in desperate need 
of drastic health care reform. American women, in particular, need 
help as they pay more for preventive care than men. Studies show that 
these costs cause women to utilize such care (including 
contraceptives) less than they should. The Affordable Care Act 
remedies this problem by shifting contraceptive costs from employees 
to employers. Because of the sensitive nature of the issue, the 
government was forced to exempt or accommodate certain religious 
groups from the contraceptive mandate. Other accommodated parties 
such as employers with fewer than fifty employees and grandfathered 
insurance plans were also excluded from the mandate leaving tens of 
millions of Americans outside of its reach. 
This Article then described how the country began to place a 
special emphasis on religious freedom soon after its settlement in the 
1600s and 1700s. Government favoring of religion was expressly 
eliminated from consideration in the First Amendment while freedom 
of conscience was protected. These protections were widely 
celebrated. However, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is 
vague and does not define the term religion or what it means to 
exercise religion. This omission left the issue of interpreting its 
meaning to Congress and the courts. Judges initially interpreted the 
Free Exercise Clause narrowly; courts reasoned that the government 
needed to be able to operate without a myriad of accommodations 
granted to religious adherents. With this narrow interpretation, the 
government was granted the freedom to enact anti-polygamy laws, 
Social Security laws, military conscription laws, Sunday closing laws, 
 
464 Solomon, supra note 453, at 122. 
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Social Security identification requirements, prison regulations, and 
state taxation of products sold by a religious organization. 
This narrow interpretation was expanded in the mid-1900s when 
the Supreme Court subjected laws burdening religion to a balancing 
test that tipped in favor of religious freedom. Judges would balance 
the substantial burden on a religious adherent with the government’s 
interest in the regulation. A governmental interest needed to be 
compelling and narrowly tailored to pass judicial scrutiny. The sea 
change in freedom of religion case law came in Smith, where the 
Supreme Court held that the government only needed a rational basis 
to enact laws of general applicability—even if these laws 
substantially burdened religious exercise. Congress reacted to the 
public outrage against the Smith decision and enacted RFRA in near 
unanimous fashion. Congress stated that this statute protected 
religious freedom in a broad manner. For parties covered under 
RFRA, the Smith test did not apply, and the government needed a 
compelling interest coupled with evidence that it chose the least 
restrictive means possible to effectively meet its goals. RLUIPA 
broadened RFRA’s definition of religion and removed the reference 
to the First Amendment and much of its limiting judicial precedent. 
This American tradition of protecting religious freedom helped 
Hobby Lobby prove that it should be excluded from the contraceptive 
mandate’s coverage. The Supreme Court, ruling via a narrow 5-4 
majority, held that Congress intended that RFRA cover for-profit 
corporations because federal law defined persons to include for-profit 
corporations, and the context of the statute and similar laws did not 
provide otherwise. The majority then found that the Greens held a 
sincere religious belief that the contraceptive mandate substantially 
burdened them. The Court conceded that the government had a 
compelling interest in providing women cost-free access to 
contraceptives but found that the Religious Non-Profit Workaround 
provided a less restrictive (or less burdensome) way to meet this need. 
This opinion provoked a passionate dissent from Justice Ginsburg, 
who claimed that RFRA was never designed to protect for-profit 
corporations, and that the majority was opening up the law for 
companies to cloak discrimination in employment as sincere religious 
exercise. 
The Hobby Lobby case remedied two major legal issues in need of 
resolution with the following conclusions: (1) for-profit corporations 
are covered under RFRA, and (2) the contraceptive mandate could not 
overcome RFRA’s demanding standard. This Article argued that this 
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decision was proper considering the broad brush used by Congress to 
protect religious freedom in RFRA, the most logical reading of the 
statutory text (which added the least restrictive alternative prong to 
further protect religious freedom), the special solicitude that religion 
in general garners in the American culture, and the fact that female 
employees at Hobby Lobby will still receive some, but not all, 
contraceptives at no cost. 
Finally, this Article proves that the Hobby Lobby case was not just 
interesting from a legal perspective. This decision spun off many 
important legal dilemmas. For example, after Hobby Lobby, may a 
publicly traded corporation, with a more diverse group of 
shareholders (including one majority shareholder with strong 
religious beliefs), make a successful challenge under RFRA? The 
majority limited its Hobby Lobby ruling to closely held corporations 
but did not specifically rule that larger corporations could never 
qualify for protection. The majority only stated that such challenges 
were unlikely. Also, the Hobby Lobby opinion pushed the Smith case 
into even murkier territory as all different types of litigants 
(individuals, non-profit corporations, unincorporated businesses, and 
for-profit corporations) now may successfully make RFRA claims. 
This Article chose a few of the most prominent ethical dilemmas 
for analysis. For example, a major ethical debate surrounds the idea of 
a corporation being able to exercise religion. The “Religion as 
Inherently Human” position posits that only humans have the capacity 
to have sincere religious experiences. On the other side, the 
“Corporate Conduit” position holds that corporations exist to do the 
bidding of the majority of their shareholders. The “Corporate 
Conduit” position has led corporations to take the position that 
environmentally safe and socially responsible business practices 
matter. If corporate owners can express their beliefs in pollution 
reduction, improved global labor standards, and climate change, the 
theory posits, they can surely exercise religious beliefs as well. 
Another ethical dilemma revolves around third parties and whether 
it is ethical for religious employers to take away a government 
entitlement from their employees. The “Religion as Cornerstone” 
position holds that these difficult choices between religion and third 
party rights often tip in favor of religion because religion has always 
been a cornerstone of American greatness. This special solicitude 
toward religion led Congress to pass RFRA and its exceptionally 
strong protection of religious exercise. The “Third Party Rights” 
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position, on the other hand, stands for the idea that an employer’s 
right to exercise religion stops at the point such exercise injures third 
parties. 
The Hobby Lobby case also brings into the spotlight the dilemma 
of whether the courts have an ethical right to scrutinize whether a 
religious belief is sincere or whether a religious belief is too 
attenuated from the circumstances to substantially burden religion. 
The “Government Must Govern” position holds, like the Smith 
decision, that the government must be allowed to enact generally 
applicable laws to structure society and protect the public good 
without having to accommodate a multitude of religious exercise 
claims. In many circumstances, the government needs to be able to 
execute a uniform policy. On the other side, the “Let Religions 
Ponder Religion” position holds that courts have no place second-
guessing a person’s religious beliefs. This position would argue that 
RFRA’s broad protection for religion is also the most ethical way to 
deal with these claims. 
There are certainly other ethical dilemmas created by the Hobby 
Lobby decision. It will be interesting to see future articles analyze 
these issues and delve into creative solutions using tools from 
philosophy, theology, sociology, and other relevant fields in addition 
to the law. As soon as these articles are published, however, new 
issues will appear on the horizon, because the traffic buzzing around 
the intersection of religious freedom and generally applicable 
regulations never stops. The next shoe to drop, as mentioned briefly 
in Part II, will come from cases filed by religions non-profit 
corporations challenging the Non-Profit Workaround. These potential 
cases prove that Hobby Lobby was only the beginning of a new post-
Smith sea change in the area of religious freedom, and it will be 
interesting to see the impact of the decision as time passes and new 
issues arise. 
 
